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Facilitating Meaningful Change Within U.S. Law Schools
PATRICK H. GAUGHAN*
ABSTRACT
Despite the widely recognized challenges and complaints facing U.S.
legal education, very little is understood about how law schools can adapt
faster and better. This Article uses institutional theory, behavioral
economics, and psychology to explain why change has proven so difficult for
U.S. law schools. Next, using institutional entrepreneurship, the Article
explains the theoretical steps necessary to overcome the institutional
resistance to change. The Article then discusses the characteristics of
opportunities that are most likely to better meet the needs of law students
while also providing sustainable benefits to the individually innovating law
schools. Using management theory, the Article then proposes a seven-step
change process model to enable individual law schools to systematically
overcome institutional resistance, formulate unique strategies, and actually
achieve meaningful change.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a world in which law school enrollment plummets twenty-nine
percent over a six-year period and the reduced levels are viewed as “the new
reality for legal education.”1 Some law schools become so desperate for
students that they no longer even require applicants to take the LSAT.2 Or
consider another situation where, ten months after graduation, only seventythree percent of law school graduates are employed full-time in long-term
jobs that either require bar passage or consider a J.D. to be an advantage.3 Or

1

Karen Sloan, Number of Students Enrolling in Law School Basically Flat,
NAT’L
L.J.
(Dec.
15,
2016),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202774844249/Number-of-StudentsEnrolling-in-Law-School-Basically-Flat?mcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=ALL
[https://perma.cc/34CE-8AMP].
2
Sarah Randazzo, Law Schools Say: Please Come, No LSAT Required, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/law-schools-say-please-come-nolsat-required-1512556201 [https://perma.cc/N35U-MM9K].
3
ABA Legal Education Section Releases Employment Data for Graduating
Law
Class
of
2016,
AM.
BAR
ASS'N
(May
11,
2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_a
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consider a situation in which the quality of recent law graduates is so low
that the average Multistate Bar Exam Score reaches its lowest level ever.4
For the first time ever, within a period of about one year, three ABA
accredited law schools effectively announce that they are closing.5
Unfortunately, these situations constitute the current reality—and U.S. law
schools are in the middle of it.
For decades, numerous authors have bemoaned the state of U.S. legal
education.6 Each has made constructive suggestions about what U.S. law
schools should do about it.7 Some have focused on teaching techniques and

dmissions_to_the_bar/statistics/2017_employment_data_2016_graduates_news_rele
ase.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EJA-KCAF].
4
Derek Muller, February 2017 MBE bar scores collapse to all-time record low
in test history, EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY BLOG (Apr. 7, 2017),
http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/?month=april-2017&view=calendar
[https://perma.cc/2SUW-MMD2].
5
The first two ABA law schools to announce closure in 2017 were Whittier
Law School and Charlotte Law School. See Sonali Kohli, Rosanna Xia, & Theresa
Watanabe, Whittier Law School is closing, due in part to low student achievement.
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2017), http://beta.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-eduwhittier-law-school-closing-20170420-story.html
[https://perma.cc/BQ82-98G9]
(announcing the school’s apparent shutdown after a series of problems); Elizabeth
Olson, For-Profit Charlotte School of Law Closes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/business/dealbook/for-profit-charlotte-schoolof-law-closes.html [https://perma.cc/N2D7-JTVP]. The third ABA law school to
“effectively” announce that they were closing is Valparasio Law School when they
announced that they were “suspending admissions” and exploring “alternative
possibilities.” Andrew Clark, Valparaiso University law school stops admissions,
INDIANAPOLIS
STAR
(Nov.
16,
2017),
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2017/11/16/valparaiso-university-law-schooladmission-suspended/872130001/ [https://perma.cc/8L95-68CZ].
6
See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Butterfly Effects: The Possibilities of Law
Teaching in a Democracy, 41 DUKE L.J. 741, 786–92 (1992) (discussing several
ways that academization has affected legal education); Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity
Lost: How Law School Disappoints Law Students, The Public, and the Legal
Profession, 44 CAL. W. L. Rev. 219, 220–21 (2007) (arguing that law schools are
flooding the job market with lawyers lacking practical skills); Harry T. Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 34, 34 (1992) (criticizing the lack of cohesion between legal education and
the culture of law firms); Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education,
1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211, 211–12 (1948) (describing several problems with the
traditional "case teaching" method in law schools).
7
See, e.g., Richard E. Redding, The Legal Academy Under Erasure, 64 CATH.
U. L. REV. 359, 363–64 (2015) (arguing for specific reforms tied to practical skills
training); Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite
Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV.
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subject matter.8 Some have focused on legal scholarship.9 Some have
focused on clinical education and access to justice.10 Yet others have
focused on how to improve the recruiting of historically underrepresented
groups.11 Some have even recommended completely redesigning U.S. legal
education.12 Even though U.S. law schools have responded to many of these
705, 707–08 (1997) (arguing that more mentoring by law professors would combat
many ethical issues faced by new lawyers).
8
See, e.g., Brent E. Newton, The Ninety-five Theses: Systemic Reforms of
American Legal Education and Licensure, 64 S.C. L. REV. 55, 140–41 (2012)
[hereinafter Newton I] (critiquing problems in law school curricula, teaching
methods, and student assessments); Daniel Thies, Rethinking Legal Education in
Hard Times: The Recession, Practical Legal Education, and the New Job Market, 59
J. LEGAL EDUC. 598, 611–13 (2010) (calling for more practical training in law
schools in response to needs of legal job market).
9
See, e.g., Brent E. Newton, Preaching What They Don’t Practice: Why Law
Faculties’ Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship and Devaluation of Practical
Competencies Obstruct Reform in the Legal Academy, 62 S.C. L. REV. 105, 148–49
(2010) [hereinafter Newton II] (arguing that law schools must less on professors'
scholarship); Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90
YALE L.J. 1113, 1117–19 (1981) (providing examples criticizing legal scholarship);
Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1327–29 (2002)
(assessing the current state of law school scholarship).
10
See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: An Agenda for Legal
Education and Research, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 531, 548–50 (2013).
11
See, e.g., Meera E. Deo, Looking Forward to Diversity in Legal Academia, 29
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 352, 354–55 (2014) (providing overview of
diversity in legal academia and the underrepresentation of women of color); Charles
R. Lawrence III, Minority Hiring in AALS Law Schools: The Need for Voluntary
Quotas, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 429, 430–31 (1986) (calling for law schools to open more
positions for minority professors); Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market
Lock-in Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727, 728–32 (2000) (analyzing
underrepresentation of minorities in legal academia from a monopoly standpoint);
Richard H. Sander, A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 410 (2004) (analyzing the effects of affirmative
action policies on African American law school applicants); Linda F. Wightman, The
Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences
of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 10 (1997) (comparing outcomes for minority students with or without
affirmative action policies).
12
See, e.g., WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 194–202 (2007) (providing examples
and recommendations for a new integrated legal education); ROY STUCKEY ET AL.,
BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROADMAP 1–5 (2007)
(advocating for long overdue reforms in legal education); David R. Barnhizer,
Redesigning the American Law School, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 249, 309–10 (2010)
(discussing how competition will force law school reform); Paul Campos,
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suggestions, their responses typically have been small relative to the dramatic
changes occurring across society. As a result, the perceived value of a U.S.
legal education has continued to deteriorate.
To date, most commentators have assumed that U.S. law schools (and
law faculty) are intentionally resistant to change.13 However, it is possible
that U.S. law schools are otherwise inhibited from quickly and distinctively
adapting. This prospect presents some intriguing questions. What is the
origin of this apparent inability of U.S. law schools to evolve faster and more
distinctively? Even more fundamentally, what can be done to address these
conditions to facilitate meaningful change within U.S. law schools?
In looking to answer these questions, the present Article begins by
focusing on two complementary theoretical explanations. One explanation is
based upon behavioral economics and psychology.14 Among other things,
this approach focuses on decision-making within the context of individual
and group psychology.15 Another explanation is based upon sociological
institutional theory, and focuses on the institutionalization of law and legal

Perspectives on Legal Education Reform: The Crisis of the American Law School, 46
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 177, 222–23 (2013) (arguing for reforms of unsustainable
law school costs); Newton I, supra note 8, at 140–41 (arguing for systemic reforms
in law schools).
13
See Barnhizer, supra note 12, at 252 (assuming a conscious choice to change
in stating that “[t]he challenge is whether law schools will adapt to the changing
environment through intelligent strategic choice or ignore the dynamics of change.”);
Newton I, supra note 8, at 56 (describing law school “intransigence” in response to
calls for reform); STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 1 (assuming voluntary choice to
change “if legal educators step back and consider how they can most effectively
prepare students for practice.”); see also Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law
School Matrix: Reforming Legal Education in a Culture of Competition and
Conformity, 60 VAND. L. REV. 515, 520 (assuming a cognitive decision resulting
from a law school culture that “discourages faculty from investing the time and
intellectual resources necessary to make . . . reforms work”).
14
See generally Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and
the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1558 (1998) (interpreting an economic analysis of
law to show its connections with psychology).
15
Although beyond the scope of the current paper, the distinction between
institutional theory and behavioral economics is surprisingly subtle. According to
Christine Oliver, Sustainable Competitive Advantage: Combining Institutional and
Resource Based Views, STRATEGIC MGMT. J., 697, 699 (1997), “[i]nstitutional
theorists emphasize the extent to which firm behavior is complaint, habitual,
unreflective, and socially defined.” Id. In contrast, behavioral economics modify
the rational assumptions of classical economics in favor of “assumptions of ‘bounded
rationality,’ ‘bounded willpower,’ and ‘bounded self-interest.’” Posner, supra note
14, at 1553. Therefore, both institutional theory and behavioral economics reject
purely rational decision-making by focusing on particular limitations.
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education.16 Incorporating both of these explanations, this Article argues that
individual U.S. law schools actually can adapt faster and better. However,
this requires U.S. law schools to address internal challenges while also
pursing externally-focused, distinctive, and meaningful change. Within this
context, the last Section of this Article proposes a change process model for
U.S. law schools to overcome embedded institutional and behavioral
resistance to change.
To be clear, the present Article does not place blame on anyone. It also
does not recommend any universal survival strategy for all U.S. law schools.
Given the different stakeholders, resources, and market positions of various
U.S. law schools, there is no “one size fits all” solution. Instead, this Article
focuses on how to improve law school decision-making processes to better
establish a meaningful external market focus, and formulate unique and
valuable strategies. It all begins by applying behavioral economics and
institutional theory, and ends with a process intended to facilitate uniquely
meaningful innovations by individual law schools.
II. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL RESISTANCE TO
CHANGE
Ordinarily, most people assume that human beings—including law
faculty—are completely rational. This certainly aligns with the wellestablished assumptions of classical economics. This perspective “assumes
that a person [or entity] can perfectly process available information about
alternative courses of action, and can rank possible outcomes in order of
expected utility . . . [and then] choose the course of action that will maximize
[the] expected utility . . . .”17 Most recommendations for change in U.S. law
schools clearly assume these capabilities.18 However, are they correct?
Critics of classical economics have long questioned whether the
assumption of rationality overstates its case and “exaggerates actual human
cognitive capacities.”19 For these critics, a “richer model . . . would look to
psychology to develop a more realistic view of cognitive processes, and also
look to sociology to obtain a more accurate picture of social influences on

16

W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 2, 48–49 (David
Whetten et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter SCOTT I].
17
Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors:
A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 23 (1989).
18
See generally Barnhizer, supra note 12, at 252; Newton I, supra note 8, at 56;
STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 1; Sturm & Guinier, supra note 13.
19
Ellickson, supra note 17, at 23.
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human behavior.”20 This is exactly what the present Article attempts to do.
The Article first looks at behavioral economics and psychology to explain
distortions in individual and group decision-making.21 The Article then
looks at institutional theory to examine how social structures, interactions
and pressures shape—and sometimes dictate—organizational behavior.22 As
applied to U.S. law schools, both approaches provide insight into the
mechanisms that may be distorting the ability of individual law schools to
adapt faster and better. Collectively, they also suggest some solutions.23
A. Behavioral Economics and Psychology.
Behavioral economics “is [classical] economics minus the assumption
that people are rational maximizers of their satisfactions.”24 In this way,
behavioral economics diverges from classical economics by recognizing that
individual decision-makers are often subject to significant limitations. These
limitations are based upon psychology and often explain why individuals or
groups deviate from the traditional expectations of classical economics.
These key limitations are: bounded rationality; bounded willpower; and
bounded self-interest.25
The first assumption of behavioral economics is bounded rationality.
Actually, a better name would be “bounded cognitive capacity.” Bounded
rationality refers to the widely recognized limitation “that human cognitive
abilities are not infinite.”26 Humans do not have limitless cognitive abilities,
energy, or memory.27 As a result, people are often forced to use various
coping mechanisms.28 These often lead to deviations from strictly rational
decision-making.
For instance, due to bounded rationality, law faculty members would not
be expected to easily make decisions that: consciously and fully comprehend
the complexity of changes in society; then reconcile these changes with the
demands of the legal profession; then propose solutions that meet the
requirements of legal education; and then figure out how the faculty
20
Id.; see also Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism
About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 470–74 (1974) (contrasting Posner's theory
with psychology and sociology).
21
See infra Part II.A.
22
See infra Part II.B; see also Oliver, supra note 15.
23
See infra Part V.B.
24
Posner, supra note 14, at 1551–52.
25
See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476–77 (1998); see also Posner, supra note 14, at 1553–58.
26
Jolls et al., supra note 25, at 1477.
27
Id.
28
Id.
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member’s individual law school can establish a distinctive and valuable
approach for the external (student) market. The cognitive requirements are
simply too high. As such, bounded rationality alone may provide a
significant explanation for the absence of more adaptive behavior by U.S.
law schools.
The second assumption of behavioral economics is bounded willpower.
Bounded willpower refers to the tendency of people to pursue convenient,
short-term, gratification even where this clearly undermines achieving more
rationally important long-term goals.29 Recognition that bounded willpower
exists is shown whenever a person decides to take short-term precautions in
order to achieve more important long-term goals. For instance, many people
join Weight Watchers in order to successfully reduce the consumption of
food and ultimately lose weight. These people recognize the need to avoid
the temptation of eating unhealthy foods, but also understand that their own
bounded willpower will not stop them from consuming too much unhealthy
food. Additional steps are therefore necessary—like joining Weight
Watchers. The rational thoughts are present but the short-term will is often
lacking.30
One example of how bounded willpower might present challenges to law
faculty would be in limiting the extent to which a law school decides to
pursue unique and innovative programs. For law faculty, bounded willpower
could certainly play a role in deciding whether to pursue bold, distinctive,
changes versus only making changes sufficient to “kick the can down the
road.” In the current environment for legal education, few people would
rationally expect minimal adaptation by law schools to be sufficient to
achieve long term goals—like survival. Prompt and decisive approaches are
certainly more likely to serve the long-term interests of both the individual
law school and the faculty in general. However, bounded willpower suggests
that minimally sufficient adaptation avoids the tougher task of having to
confront—and sometimes renegotiate—the expectations and relative value of
faculty contributions. For instance, rather than having to definitively resolve
such issues as the relative role and value of academics versus practitioners in
legal education, it is far easier for law faculties to pursue less ambitious
goals. As such, bounded willpower undermines the ability of law faculty to
resolve the tougher issues and pursue more ambitious change.
In similar fashion, bounded willpower also presents issues as to the
extent to which an individual law school can sustain a focus on external
market opportunities. As a practical matter, the unbridled pursuit of external
market opportunities presents an unknown threat to the established
relationships across law faculty. Consequently, rather than truly making a
transition to a sustained market-led focus, bounded willpower would suggest
29
30

Id. at 1479.
Id.
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that law faculty would focus on making incremental internal improvements
in curricular offerings—even though an external market-led approach would
be more ambitious, distinctive and responsive.
The third assumption of behavioral economics is bounded self-interest.
This assumption is less relevant for present purposes. Bounded self-interest
refers to the common recognition that most people care about more than just
themselves. Consequently, individuals tend to pursue utility functions that
extend beyond mere self-interest.31 As applied to law faculty, bounded selfinterest is probably the clearest example of why the assumptions of classical
economics are at least partially erroneous. Factually speaking, the objective
manifestations of most law faculty would suggest that they deeply care about
society, the profession, their students, and the law. Unlike the other bounded
limitations, bounded self-interest would militate in favor of meaningful law
school adaptation—not against it.
Combining these assumptions, behavioral economics provides a
relatively straightforward explanation for the resistance of law faculty to
change. Both bounded rationality and bounded willpower are limited by the
prospective complexity and consequences of decisions.
Under the
circumstances, it is completely understandable why law faculties might tend
to maintain an internally focused status quo bias. The behavior is
understandable even if not strictly rational.
In sharp contrast, the vilification of law faculty by some critics rests
upon the belief that the resistance to change is actually part of a selfcentered, rational, power play by law faculty.32 For example, some critics
claim that:
[T]enured law professors . . . [rationally] seek to serve their
professional and economic interests at the expense of their
students’ best interest, [rationally] have captured law schools
and the American Bar Association’s (ABA) accrediting
process . . . . [Law professors have also rationally demanded]
increased faculty sizes and salaries, and their focus on
scholarly work . . . [that] only diverts professors from their
teaching responsibilities.
Law faculties [rationally]
instituted allegedly self-serving practices, such as hiring

31

Jolls et al., supra note 25, at 1479.
See, e.g., Redding, supra note 7, at 365; see also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA,
FAILING LAW SCHOOLS, 44–51 (2012) [hereinafter TAMANAHA I] (discussing
problems with law school professors being overpaid for doing less work); Campos,
supra note 12, at 186 (discussing how law school faculty’s demands have driven up
tuition costs).
32
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scholars instead of professionals who can provide practical
lawyering skills training to students.33
As tempting as it might be to throw tenured law faculty under the bus,
behavioral economics suggests that these criticisms may be overstated.
Objectively, there may be greater room for corrective action.
For instance, to date, suggestions to improve law schools have only
rarely included mechanisms to mitigate the inherent faculty uncertainties
present in prospective change.34 However, where there is “uncertainty
regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform,”35 the behavioral
economics literature recognizes that a status quo bias will likely exist. More
specifically, “there is a bias toward the status quo (and hence against
efficiency-enhancing reforms) whenever some of the individual gainers and
losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand.”36 This insight alone
suggests that focus on decisional processes and results—as proposed by this
Article—should go further toward achieving meaningful change than simply
explaining what law schools should do. Greater attention should be paid to
how law schools can achieve it.
In summary then, behavioral economics would suggest that status quo
bias can become more manageable by addressing (or minimizing): cognitive
issues (related to bounded rationality), short-term priority and convenience
issues (related to bounded willpower), and individual uncertainty presented
by aggressive organizational change.
B. Institutional Theory and Institutionalization
Like behavioral economics, new institutional theory (from within
sociology) also focuses on the limitations of decision-making. However,
institutional theory generally focuses on the interaction of institutional
structures and relationships to explain the resulting anomalies. In this regard,
both behavioral economics and institutional theory are complementary to
33

Redding, supra note 7, at 361–63.
A mechanism to address uncertainties inherent in change is incorporated in
the model proposed in the current article. Cf. John C. Weistart, The Law School
Curriculum: The Process of Reform, 36 DUKE L.J. 317 (1987) (stating that “[t]here is
an appearance of great ferment in discussions of the American Law School and its
curriculum. Proposals for reform abound . . . . Only a few of the proposals put forth
to date are merely fanciful . . . . Curriculum planning, however, takes place in a
world of restraints and costs. Despite the obviousness of this point, it has received
little attention in the present discussion.”).
35
Raquel Fernandez and Dani Rodrik, Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in
the Presence of Uncertainty, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1146, 1146 (1991).
36
Id.
34
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each other. Both can be used to explain, and potentially address, the failure
of law schools to adapt faster and better. Indeed, both assume limitations on
the cognitive capabilities of decision-makers. While behavioral economics
relies upon psychological foundations, institutional theory relies upon
sociological foundations.
In the beginning, “old” institutional theory focused on the processes by
which organizations sometimes consciously and rationally deviate from their
stated goals.37 In this regard, “to institutionalize” means “to infuse with
value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand.”38 In old
institutionalism, “issues of influence, coalitions, and competing values were
central, along with power and informal structures.”39 Put differently, old
institutional theory assumed the existence of conscious, rational, reasons for
organizational behavior.
Beginning in the late 1970s, “new” institutional theory developed.40
New institutional theory (and subsequent versions) recognizes that
organizational behavior is not always determined by conscious
“technological imperatives” and “resource dependencies.”41 Ultimately,
organizations are subject to institutional forces that consist of “[r]egulative
systems, normative systems, and cultural-cognitive systems.”42 Together,
these three pillars of institutionalism “form a continuum moving ‘from the
conscious to the unconscious, from the legally enforced to the taken for
granted.’”43 In many ways, new institutional theory is an organization-level
analogue to “groupthink” theory (where the primary concern of individuals is

37

See SCOTT I, supra note 16, at 21 (discussing how institutional theory
originated in economic theory in the late nineteenth century as a challenge to “the
conventional canon that economics could be reduced to a set of universal laws”). It
was not until the 1930s or 1940s that sociology adapted the concepts to more closely
analyze the behavior of organizations.
See generally Philip Selznick,
Institutionalism “Old” and “New”, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 270 (1996) (analyzing the
history of older to newer institutional theory).
38
PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL
INTERPRETATION 17 (1957); see also W. Richard Scott, The Adolescence of
Institutional Theory, 32 ADMIN. SCI. Q., 493, 493–94 (1987) [hereinafter Scott II]
(providing historical background on Selznick’s institutional theory research).
39
Royston Greenwood & C.R. Hinings, Understanding Radical Organizational
Change: Bringing Together the Old and the New Institutionalism, 21 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 1022, 1022 (1996).
40
SCOTT I, supra note 16, at xix.
41
W. Richard Scott, Approaching Adulthood: The Maturity of Institutional
Theory, 37 THEORY & SOC’Y 427, 427 (2008).
42
SCOTT I, supra note 16, at 51.
43
Id. (citation omitted).
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“conformity to group values and ethics” sometimes at the expense of taskconscious decision-making).44
Pursuant to new institutional theory, some organizational decisionmaking results from taken-for-granted institutionalized assumptions and
industry-wide (field-level) pressures.45 As such, institutionalization is “a
social process by which individuals [within organizations] come to accept a
shared definition of social reality—a conception whose validity is seen as
independent of the actor’s own views or actions but is taken for granted as
defining the ‘way things are’ and/or the ‘way things are to be done.’”46
In fact, new institutional theory recognizes that “[m]any formal
organizational structures arise as reflections of rationalized institutional
rules.”47 New institutional theory defines “rationalized institutional rules” as
those that are cloaked in apparent legitimacy without critical evaluation (or
re-evaluation) of their relationship to the organization’s stated goals. In this
way, rationalized institutional rules function as “myths which organizations
incorporate, gaining legitimacy, resources, stability, and enhanced survival
prospects [without being directly linked to better serving the organization’s
stated goals].”48 Of course, this raises the rather fundamental question of
how once independently-thinking and competitive organizations ever permit
themselves to be subject to such collectivist institutional control. How can
this happen?
According to new institutional theory, as entities increasingly coalesce
into a field, individual organizational perspectives and activities naturally
tend to align with the collective group. As aptly stated by DiMaggio and
Powell:
Once disparate organizations in the same line of business
[such as individual law schools] are structured into an actual
field (as . . . by competition, the state, or the professions),

44
See generally Marlene E. Turner & Anthony R. Pratkanis, Twenty-five Years
of Groupthink Theory and Research: Lessons from the Evaluation of a Theory, 73
ORG. BEHAV. AND HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 105–06 (1998) (defining
“groupthink” and analyzing its effects on decision-making processes).
45
Technically speaking, “field” and “industry” are not equivalent. According to
Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cade Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV.
147, 152 (1983), a “field” is broader than “industry.” However, for the current
purposes, the distinction is not considered significant.
46
Scott II, supra note 38, at 496.
47
John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal
Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 340 (1977).
48
Id.
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powerful forces emerge that lead them to become more
similar to one another.49
In this regard, an institutional “field” is a community of organizations or
individuals that “directly interact with one another or are influenced by each
other in a meaningful way.”50
As a field evolves, constituent organizations tend to increasingly align
and incorporate common meanings in reference to each other. In the process,
organizational focus tends to shift from competitively serving the needs of
the external market to simply integrating the organization into the collective
expectations of the field.51 Individual competition evolves into group
compliance. This integration is achieved to greater or lesser extent through
pressures that can be coercive, normative, or result from the inherent
uncertainty of the given task.52 Over time these pressures provide the
foundations for “institutions” that seek to reinforce and substitute interorganizational alignment for individual organizational innovation.
To some extent, U.S. legal education is a great example of how the
institutionalization of a field can progress. At the time of the American
Revolution, the training of lawyers was distributed across unregulated,
individual, apprenticeships.53 There were no requirements for formal legal
education. However, over time, some requirements for legal apprenticeships
became more formalized.
Eventually, students recognized some
apprenticeships as being better than others. This led some of the individual
apprenticeships to grow and transition into practice oriented private law
schools.54 The field of legal education began to coalesce. Next, the
establishment of the field of legal education attracted additional participants
in the form of offerings by some liberal arts colleges.
By the early nineteenth century, the established colleges began to absorb
the practice-based law schools into the emerging educational institutions.55
49

DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 45, at 148.
Royston Greenwood, Roy Suddaby & C.R. Hinings, Theorizing Change: The
Role of Professional Associations in the Transformation of Institutionalized Fields,
45 ACAD. MGMT. J. 58, 59 (2002).
51
Id.
52
Technically, the sources of institutional homogenization are coercive
isomorphism, normative isomorphism and mimetic isomorphism. However, for
current purposes, these terms-of-art were deemed to be unnecessary. See Eshani
Beddewela & Jenny Fairbrass, Seeking Legitimacy Through CSR: Institutional
Pressures and Corporate Responses of Multinationals in Sri Lanka, 136 J. BUS.
ETHICS 503, 506 (2016).
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ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850S TO THE 1980S 3 (1983).
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By the 1850s, “[l]aw was becoming a boom industry.”56 As the century
progressed, even though most lawyers were still being trained “on-the-job,”
law schools claimed to offer a more “systematic, academic experience
designed to upgrade the intellectual quality of law and lawyers and thus
enhance their professional status.”57 Not coincidentally, the new law school
offerings responded to calls “for a more rigorous training and more
systematic bar examinations.”58 Standardization spread. By the late 1890s,
increasingly, the admission to the bar for most states required some type of
formal legal studies and passage of a bar examination.59 As the field of legal
education expanded, institutional forces also increased.
As might be expected, over the ensuing decades, the institutional
pressures on legal education continued to increase. However, there was still
variance in the form of legal studies.60 The duration of legal studies also
varied.61 But once Harvard emerged as the leading U.S. law school “almost
all [other] university-affiliated schools were only too anxious to emulate its
developments.”62 The institutionalization of legal education progressed even
further.
Consequently, although by the early 1900s there continued to be battles
between the doctrinal focus of Harvard, and the practical focus of others, the
alignment of legal educational organizations continued to increase.63 With
the help of the ABA Committee on Legal Education and Admissions to the
Bar, the further institutionalization of U.S. legal education was well on its
way.64
By 1952, the U.S. Department of Education had become the national
agency responsible for the accreditation of U.S. law schools.65 In turn, the
U.S. Department of Education delegated most accreditation issues to another
institution: the Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to
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Id. at 22.
Id. at 24.
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Id. at 25.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 36–37, 39.
61
Id. at 36–37.
62
Id. at 39. As a practical matter, it should be noted that the emulative aspect of
law school institutionalization likely perpetuates the hierarchical “pecking order”
among schools while also providing institutionalized, isomorphic, pressures.
Consequently, even though institutionalized, it would not be surprising to find
meaningful innovations within leading law schools eventually percolating down to
other law schools.
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See STEVENS, supra note 53, at 39.
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Id. at 93.
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the Bar.66 Although technically independent, the Council was (and still is)
related to a section of the ABA—yet another institution. Today, the Council
has a network of affiliate organizations/institutions to which most U.S. law
schools belong. These include: The Association of American of Law
Schools (AALS); Clinical Legal Education Association (CLEA); Law School
Admission Council (LSAC); National Association of Law Placement
(NALP); and National Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE).67 Even if
these institutions do not have express regulatory power over U.S. law
schools, they still play important normative roles.68 Each has membership
requirements and provides a peer-mechanism for institutional alignment—
even where the individual law school might have divergent interests.
Of course, in addition to the external institutional pressures listed above,
law schools also must navigate internal pressures. As noted previously,
institutional pressures “are transported by various carriers—cultures,
structures, and routines—and they operate at multiple levels.”69 Thus,
institutional pressures can be internally conveyed by individual faculty—in
addition to the external pressures transmitted by way of peer organizations,
professional associations, and regulators. In this way, whether intended or
not, various taken-for-granted assumptions regarding the proper approach to
legal education are routinely internalized into law school decision-making.
Making matters even more problematic is that the taken-for-granted
assumptions in institutionalized fields are not completely devoid of any
collective validity. In fact, many of the institutionalized assumptions were
once completely valid but are often now outdated. As such, the taken-forgranted assumptions often simply represent a field-wide consensus
established long-ago regarding such things as:




the proper scope of legal education;
the proper ways of educating law students; and
what constitutes the practice of law.

In regard to each of these topics (and many more), institutional theory would
posit that legal education has “become defined by shared systems of
66

Id.
Council Meetings, ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the
Bar, Meeting held at Loews Santa Monica Beach Hotel, Santa Monica, California,
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BAR
ASS’N
(Mar.
9–11,
2017),
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/about_us/leadership/council_me
etings.html [https://perma.cc/E2GY-HDST].
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It is asserted that the forces are actually both normative and mimetic.
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into the distinction between these types of institutional forces.
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meaning.”70 Law schools are deeply embedded in their own institutionalized
networks of beliefs, cultural schemes, and conventions71—even while the
external environment has called for change. Unfortunately, due to the
institutionalization process, the ability of individual law schools to
meaningfully adapt has been buried under the convergence of multiple
institutions throughout the field of legal education.
Moreover, notably absent from any of the institutional mechanisms is
any means to rapidly reevaluate and update the ingrained assumptions.
There is little, if any, institutional consideration about the continuing validity
of the foundational assumptions. There also is little awareness of how
individual law schools can provide uniquely superior value to identified
groups of potential law students. As a result, the taken-for-granted
assumptions persist even if some of them no longer completely align with the
stated purpose of the individual law school or goals of their potential law
students. For these reasons, institutionalization often results in industry-wide
stasis and organizational resistance to change.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL SHOCKS, CARRYING CAPACITY, AND INDIVIDUAL
LAW SCHOOL PERSPECTIVES
As previously explained, both behavioral economics and institutional
theory provide ample explanations for why some organizations resist change.
As part of both approaches, otherwise rational and caring decision-makers
can steadfastly rationalize a staunch defense of the status quo or only agree to
incremental change. For these individuals, there is little imperative to
embrace distinctive and meaningful change. However, this can needlessly
lead to catastrophic consequences when the external environment suddenly is
subjected to a dramatic shock.
As an initial matter, a dramatic change in the demand for legal education
does not impact all U.S. law schools equally. Changes that could be fatal to
some law schools (like Whittier, Charlotte, and Valparaiso) are likely to be
minor inconveniences for others. As such, for some law schools, the best
approach truly might be to simply do nothing. These lucky schools can
simply wait for the incremental industry-wide collective adaptation to spread
across the entire field of legal education. In the very least, this approach
conveniently utilizes existing relationships and mechanisms. Presumably,
given the relative lack of law school mobility in rankings, 72 this approach
70

Id.
Hans Hasselbladh & Jannis Kallinikos, The Project of Rationalization: A
Critique and Reappraisal of Neo-Institutionalism in Organizational Studies, 21 ORG.
STUD. 697, 698 (2000).
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See generally David C. Yamada, Same Old, Same Old: Law School Rankings
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would also reinforce the status quo. Under these circumstances, some lucky
individual law schools might justifiably scoff at the prospect of pursuing
individual, distinctive, change. However, for other law schools, the failure to
adapt could have significant negative consequences.
As explained previously, all other things being held equal,
institutionalization simply enables all organizations within a field to align
and win (even if some stakeholders are sometimes not afforded optimal value
or opportunities). As long as the external environment essentially remains
the same, extreme institutional pressures simply remove the need for
constituent organizations to meaningfully compete or pursue distinct
advantages. Indeed, even if the external environment does change, some
lucky individual organizations will likely persist—even if their entire
industry has otherwise completely collapsed!
For example, the U.S. railroad industry is frequently referenced for
collapsing due to its own failure to adapt to external environmental
changes.73
During the late 1800s, the railroads were considered
indispensable to the U.S. economy as a driver of commerce through
transportation.74 Had the U.S. railroads simply defined their industry
broadly—as transportation—they easily could have developed and controlled
U.S. industry as it developed into new forms. But the railroads did not do
that. They failed to keep up with the external market changes and the
railroad industry ultimately collapsed.75
The indictment of industries like the railroads was concisely summarized
by Theodore Levitt in his classic 1960 Harvard Business Review article76 as
follows:
Every major industry was once a growth industry. But some
that are now riding a wave of growth enthusiasm are very
much in the shadow of decline. Others which are thought of
as seasoned growth industries have actually stopped
growing.
In every case, the reason that growth is
threatened, slowed or stopped is not because the market is
saturated. It is because there is a failure of management.77
Undoubtedly, Professor Levitt was correct. Ultimately, industry collapse is
caused by the failure of organizations to adequately respond to the changing
demands of the external market. But even where an entire industry does
collapse, there usually are at least some organizational survivors. Despite the
73
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Theodore Levitt, Marketing Myopia, HARVARD BUS. REV. 26, 26 (1960).
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collapse of the U.S. railroad industry, the four largest U.S. railroads today
still have revenues in excess of $9 billion dollars per year.78 Given that U.S.
legal education is currently nowhere near systemic collapse, it is easy to see
that some U.S. law schools (and law faculty) might rationally reject calls for
individual distinctive change.79
So, if there is nothing inherently wrong with some institutionalized
organizations refusing to individually evolve, why should any individual
U.S. law school seek to spend time and energy pursuing distinctive
meaningful change?
The answer is given in that a dramatic shock has
occurred to U.S. legal education. Consequently, a disequilibrium currently
exists in the carrying capacity of legal education. Individual U.S. law
schools now face a rather fundamental choice as to whether or not they
should try to change. Stronger organizations enjoy the luxury of time and do
not face any serious threats to their survival. However, weaker law schools
face a time-sensitive imperative. Overall, if few U.S. law schools
meaningfully adapt, then the new environment will most certainly result in a
decrease in the carrying-capacity of U.S. legal education. Over time,
survival of the fittest will mediate the market adjustment to the new, lower,
carrying-capacity equilibrium.
In contrast, if some otherwise weaker U.S. law schools are able to
distinctively and meaningfully adapt, then the impact on the carryingcapacity of U.S. legal education is far less obvious. Carrying-capacity could
even increase if the adapting law schools successfully communicate
enhanced value to new groups of potential law students, or to old groups of
law students in newly valued ways. It all depends upon how uniquely
successful the adapting U.S. schools are in pursuing, achieving, and
maintaining meaningful differentiation.
More specifically, the individual benefits of adaptation accruing to
specific law schools will be affected by the extent to which the particular
adaptation is valuable to the market as well as distinctive relative to other
organizations within the field. If everyone adapts in the exact same generic
fashion, the benefits of any innovation will be spread across all organizations
within the field. The individual benefits will be minimized as they are spread
across the established organizational pecking order. However, individual law
78

Robert Wright, The Biggest North American Railroads, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 22,
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schools that provide distinctive value to the market will uniquely enjoy the
benefits. As such, the extent of individual organizational benefits resulting
from successful innovation will depend upon two things:
1) the extent to which the organizational innovation is perceived by
potential students as offering improved value over existing
alternatives (both within and beyond legal education); and
2) the extent to which other organizations within the field are able to
meaningfully adopt and copy the new innovation.
In sum then, there is nothing inherently wrong with some law schools
deciding not to individually adapt. For some lucky law schools, this
represents a perfectly reasonable course of action. For others, the failure to
quickly and meaningfully adapt to the changed environment may lead to the
failure of the organization. Fortunately, successful individual adaptation has
benefits beyond mere survival. For individual law schools that successfully
(and quickly) adapt in meaningful and distinctive ways, the schools will
enjoy an improved comparative competitive position—regardless of their
current rank or condition. In the very least, the concept of “carrying
capacity” strongly suggests that weaker U.S. law schools should be
aggressively pursuing distinctive adaptation—rather than waiting. The
theoretical foundations for accomplishing this are discussed in the next
Section.
IV. ACHIEVING DISTINCTIVE AND MEANINGFUL CHANGE
Having clarified the fundamental choice (and consequences) facing U.S.
law schools, this Section discusses the theoretical aspects of distinctive and
meaningful change.
First, the Section explains how institutional
entrepreneurship enables change both within the institutional and (by
extension) behavioral contexts. However, merely achieving any change does
not assure that the changes will necessarily create any distinctive benefit for
the individual organization. Consequently, this Section also examines the
characteristics of resources that are most likely to provide sustainable, unique
benefits for an individual school. Finally, this Section examines the use of
strategic planning to assure the alignment of potentially distinctive
opportunities with the values, missions and resources of an individual law
school and the external market.
A. Enabling Change Through Institutional Entrepreneurs
Institutional entrepreneurship (within Institutional Theory) is defined as
the “activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional
arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to
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transform existing ones.”80 The change efforts can focus broadly across an
entire field or focus narrowly within an individual institutionalized
organization. In either instance, institutional entrepreneurship is about
figuring out how to navigate incumbent forces to facilitate organizational
change. This can include sources of both institutional and behavioral
resistance to meaningful change.
Although institutional entrepreneurship can be used across an entire
range of potential institutional circumstances, the steps and configuration
necessary to be successful will heavily depend upon the nature and
complexity of relationships involved (both individual and organizational), as
well as the relevant institutional pressures. Consequently, there is no
universal roadmap. The specific steps necessary to be successful are goaland context-dependent—perhaps even within an individual law school.
Nonetheless, the basic concepts are the same. The challenges, steps, and
parties may vary widely.
For these reasons, institutional entrepreneurs often start to pursue change
by pre-determining viable paths and configurations of resources by which
institutional change is more likely to occur. To the extent that the prospect of
potential change can be improved by being presold to key individuals,
institutional entrepreneurs are likely to begin by constructing “chains of
action” “with at least some pre-fabricated links.”81 These links channel
“action through the shape and organization of those links” rather than by
predetermining the ends to which they are put.82
Applying these same concepts to the concerns of behavioral economics,
institutional entrepreneurs can also seek to configure decision-making in
such a way as to minimize concerns caused by bounded rationality and to
increase the collective willpower to achieve meaningful change.
For instance, if a particular initiative is going to require a change in state
law to be successful, institutional entrepreneurs start by: determining how a
bill is submitted; which committees are likely to be involved; which
legislators will play a key role in bringing the bill to vote; which legislative
support personnel would likely make recommendations regarding passage;
whether any lobbyists are likely to support the bill; and whether the governor
is likely to veto the bill if it is passed. Once the “chains of action” have been
determined, the institutional entrepreneurs would proceed to personally meet
all of the individuals—even before a proposed bill has been drafted—in order
to better determine the links that are most likely to enable a favorable result.
Only after these chains of action have been established would the
80
Steve Maguire et al., Institutional Entrepreneurship in Emerging Fields:
HIV/AIDS Treatment Advocacy in Canada, 47 ACAD. MGMT. J. 657, 657 (2004).
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273, 277 (1986).
82
Id.

2018

FACILITATING CHANGE IN U.S. LAW SCHOOLS

263

institutional entrepreneurs actually start to draft and advocate for a particular
bill. To the extent possible, the bill would be “pre-wired” for success—if not
also “pre-sold.”
Similarly, institutional entrepreneurship can help individual law schools
configure their own chains of action—without “[pre]determining the ends to
which they are put.”83 For individual U.S. law schools seeking meaningful
and distinctive organizational change (within existing ABA standards),84 the
primary mechanism for such pre-fabricated links will inevitably involve the
law faculty. It is therefore critical to engage law faculty at the very
beginning. It is critical to determine whether there is sufficient faculty
support for pursuing distinctive change. It is also critical to provide a
theoretically sound model that empowers institutional entrepreneurs to
pursue meaningful opportunities.
As a practical matter, this may be as easy as simply giving this Article to
law faculty for their consideration. However, it may also require additional
preparation. Faculty may face bounded rationality challenges or otherwise
have questions or reservations. Only after achieving a consensus supporting
meaningful change, can institutional entrepreneurs start to assemble discrete
teams to ultimately recommend specific options. Of course, in order to
explain how the overall process can work, it is also necessary to describe the
techniques that can be used to successfully achieve the intended changes.
Three fundamentally different resource mobilization techniques have
been identified for institutional entrepreneurs to successfully enable
institutional change. Although each can be applied as an isolated approach,
the techniques also can be utilized in concert. According to Dorado, these
three approaches to resource mobilization are: convening, accumulating, and
leveraging.85
The first technique, convening, is a process usually used for solving
complex social problems.86 Convening is based upon the creation of a
83
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collaborative initiative that is not focused on advocacy of any individual
project. “Instead, it involves convincing [participants] of the desirability and
viability of collaborating to jumpstart the development of a solution to a
problem.”87 Convening requires “politically skilled actors” who are
instrumental in “bridging unaware, unsure or skeptical actors to explore the
possibilities of cooperation.”88 The success of institutional entrepreneurs
engaged in convening depends upon:
(1) the credibility they have among the parties involved, (2)
their familiarity with the problem being addressed, and (3)
their position as a balanced or unbiased party. They are also
quick to appreciate the beneficial impact of mutual
exchange, proficient at scanning the environment
surrounding the collaboration, and skilled in appraising the
consequences of contemplated future actions.89
Given the professional and collegial nature of many law faculties, convening
should be a key resource mobilization technique. Rather than trying to tell
faculty what should be done, convening constructively engages law faculties
to collectively help formulate solutions to an agreed-upon change
opportunity. In the process, convening provides a mechanism to address, to
the extent possible, complexity and commitment issues.
Given the previously discussed impact of institutionalization on law
school governance, the selection of one or more credible Conveners from
within the law faculty is likely to be crucial to obtaining full faculty
engagement and legitimacy for pursuing meaningful solutions. At the same
time, in order to increase the likelihood of identifying the most innovative
opportunities for distinctive meaningful change, it is clear that convening
alone is unlikely to be sufficient.
Although convening will provide engagement and legitimacy, the law
faculty as a whole is unlikely to be the most qualified to identify and
recommend external market opportunities. Optimal opportunities for change
will generally be identified by those who maintain an external marketfocused perspective. This is fundamentally different from the typical
perspective of large portions (but certainly not all) law faculty. After all, few
law faculty have ever studied marketing. Even faculty with extensive private
practice experience probably have little knowledge regarding the needs (or
recruiting) of current law students. To maintain a market-based view, it will
be necessary to empower (and possibly educate) a group that naturally has an
external customer-led focus. Additionally, it will be necessary to use one of
87
88
89
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the other two resource mobilization techniques within a broadly defined
convening resource mobilization process—either accumulation or leveraging.
Of course, within the traditionally collegial atmosphere of legal
education, most law schools would tend to select approaches with which they
are already familiar. As a result, most law schools would naturally tend to
select accumulation as the preferred means of pursuing change. As the name
suggests, “[a]ccumulation implies that support and acceptance emerge as the
uncoordinated actions of countless actors probabilistically converge.”90
Accumulation is based upon slowly developing a consensus across a field.91
An example of accumulation, cited by Dorado, was the emergence of
radio sponsorship advertising as the means by which radio transitioned from
merely being point-to-point to being a major force in mass communication.92
Originally, there was no plan to create radio sponsorship to support mass
communication. Instead, consensus gradually emerged as single-purpose
operators of radio stations realized that they could achieve better outcomes
by sponsoring radio programming rather than owning and operating their
own stations.93
As applied to U.S. law schools, accumulation would be appropriate
where significant, but causally ambiguous, changes to standards would be
desired. For instance, if a specific law school thought that it might be
appropriate to create an express exemption from bar passage requirements
for schools whose students overwhelmingly come from underprivileged
backgrounds, there would almost certainly need to be sustained discussion
about the importance of economic diversity in the bar versus the purpose of
having minimum bar passage requirements. The success of the initiative
would require building a consensus across multiple institutions from bar
examiners to the ABA.
Unfortunately, the use of accumulation is too closely aligned with a
staunch defense of the status quo. The slow pace of accumulation can
provide an illusion of meaningful organizational change while really just
drifting. Therefore, the reliance upon accumulation presents special
challenges when trying to respond to an environmental (market) shock.
Just as with institutional forces in general, the accumulation resource
mobilization technique relies upon a web of interconnections across the
entire field (typical of professional occupations) to eventually facilitate
changes.94 Using accumulation, there does not tend to be any conscious
90
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focus. The established institutional arrangements evolve through emerging
consensus rather than through any conscious effort to identify external
opportunities to add unique value.95
To sidestep the pitfalls of accumulation, this Article suggests facilitating
change within individual organizations and within the existing ABA
Standards. In this way, coordination across organizations (and with various
institutions) is minimized. By also narrowly framing the scope of potential
changes within existing ABA standards, accumulation can be avoided as a
resource mobilization technique. Individual organizational efforts are
therefore more likely to be both timely and successful.
Where fast and distinctive solutions are desired (within existing rules),
and where the options are relatively transparent to qualified individuals, a
more appropriate resource mobilization technique is leveraging.96 As with
convening, in leveraging, “[p]olitically skilled actors are the driving forces
behind this process.”97 However, unlike convening, leverage involves
advocacy for particular solutions. Institutional entrepreneurs use their
“access to, and skills in leveraging, the scarce and critical resources needed
to mount political action.”98 Leveraging is typical “when actors strategically
engage in institutional change processes.”99 This would appear to be
particularly appropriate where there is a recognized need to rapid meaningful
change.
In sum then, using institutional entrepreneurship to facilitate meaningful
change for individual law schools should probably utilize convening as the
overall resource mobilization technique. However, convening alone is
unlikely to provide optimal results. Instead, specialized groups should be
empowered (and possibly educated) to use leveraging. The leveraging
should relate to unique and sustainable opportunities for the individual law
school. Of course, this raises the next rather obvious question regarding the
characteristics of “unique and sustainable opportunities.” This is specifically
addressed below.
B. The Characteristics of Meaningful Opportunities—VRIO.
Although it might be crass to admit it, the success of all U.S. law schools
relies in part upon economic fundamentals. Given the professional
orientation of law schools, there is a normative tendency to equate economic
95
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success with simply providing a quality education.
However, the
relationship is not so simple. Economics and recruiting also play a role in
law school success. Even the very best law schools would cease to exist if
their students were unable to perceive of any value in attending the particular
school. The task is even more difficult for schools that are not as widely
recognized as being exceptional. For some law schools, recruiting and
communicating sufficient perceived value is a matter of life or death.
The importance of perceived value and recruiting is even more important
considering the correlation between a law school’s median entering LSAT
score and the subsequent average bar passage rates. Practically speaking, a
law school’s median entering LSAT score correlates highly with the school’s
eventual average bar passage rate.100 Whether or not there is a direct or
indirect causal connection is beyond the scope of this Article. The fact
remains that median LSAT score and bar passage rates are perceived by
some potential students as a measure of educational quality. Raising median
LSAT scores will therefore tend to increase (either directly or indirectly)
both the subsequent bar passage rates and economic well-being of any
individual law school.
When viewed in this way, the secret to some individual law schools
surviving is dependent upon their ability to provide a perceived superior
value proposition to prospective students. In this regard, prospective
students do not ordinarily care how the superior value is achieved. They
only care that the particular offering has superior value. In this specific
regard, the business literature recognizes two main perspectives that explain
how domestic firms can succeed in this way: the market-based view and the
resource-based view.101
The market-based view has its origins in industrial economics and
“argues that conditions within an industry, to a large extent, determine firm
strategy and performance.”102 Given the conditions and institutionalization
within U.S. legal education today, the market-based view, by itself, offers
little promise for law schools. In contrast, the resource-based view “suggests
that it is firm-specific differences that drive strategy and performance.”103
100
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The essence of the resource-based view is that the intentional configuration,
acquisition, and deployment of firm resources can provide a specific firm
with a uniquely competitive position.104 If done correctly, the development
of unique firm resources will provide the basis for a sustainable competitive
advantage.105
One way to explain sustainable competitive advantage is as follows:
A sustained competitive advantage exists when the valuecreating strategy [used by a particular law school] is
currently not being implemented by an organization’s
competitors or potential competitors and when these other
organizations are not able to imitate, either through
duplication or substitution, the benefits of the value-creating
strategy . . . . It is the inability of other organizations to
imitate that strategy that helps an organization achieve a
sustained competitive advantage.106
Within the resource-based view, a given strategy or potential opportunity can
be a source of sustainable competitive advantage if it complies with the
requirements of the “VRIO Framework.”107
The VRIO framework (within the resource-based view) is based upon the
premise that a sustainable competitive advantage can be achieved by
organizations pursuing strategies where the firm successfully deploys its
resources that are “valuable,” “rare,” “inimitable,” and “organizationally
appropriate.”108 In this regard, “firm resources include all assets, capabilities,
organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc.
controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement
strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness.”109 Once again, the
VRIO framework applies to all resources—big, little, ambitious, and
mundane.
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Importantly, one of the key resources for law schools is the law faculty.
It is for this reason that individual uncertainty and status quo bias in
behavioral economics presents such a critical issue for U.S. law schools. The
creation of law school value requires marrying the necessary firm
resources—including law faculty —with an external market that recognizes
the unique value. Since law faculty is also integral to decision-making, the
configuration of the “faculty resource” is far more complex than in
traditional business organizations.
In considering how law schools can use the VRIO framework, it is
critical to first recognize that the process of creating a sustainable
competitive advantage is largely based upon an individual organization
navigating internal concerns while also adopting an external focus that
uniquely addresses the perceptions and needs of prospective law students.
This can be done directly—through communications to prospective students.
This can also be done indirectly—through communications by graduates and
the reputation in the profession.
At the same time, merely because an individual organization seeks to
communicate unique value to the market does not mean that the substantive
quality of the education is diminished in any way. In many instances,
superior perceived value can be achieved by simply configuring traditional
educational components in a new way or adding non-educational components
to deliver unique value. In the process, if superior value is actually delivered
to the right individuals, the recruiting of superior students can increase too.
Of course, once again, all of this must be achieved within the internal context
of faculty as both a resource and a member of governance.
For example, consider the common practice of offering combined
J.D./M.B.A. degrees. As compared to law schools that cannot offer
combined degrees, there is an advantage. However, many of the combined
degree programs fail to make the most of the opportunity. Rather than
creating superior value—relative to other J.D./M.B.A. programs—the
combined programs are really just overlapping, segmented, programs offered
by separate schools. The law school handles the law; the business school
handles the business. However, superior value could be delivered if the
traditional J.D./M.B.A.s were creatively combined in a new way. For
instance, one way would be to require J.D./M.B.A.s to take some specialized
versions of their capstone courses in a multidisciplinary format. This could
be linked to local economic resources to create a signature internship
program that similarly exposes J.D./M.B.A.s to multidisciplinary problems
often missed by any one discipline alone. In this way, the program would be
unique (for a while at least) and could be more successfully promoted to
potential students with better credentials.
In short, the overall purpose of the VRIO framework is to determine
how, within existing and potential resources, a given firm can create unique
value. However, to do this, it is necessary that the value be created with a
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focus on the market and ultimately delivered in a way that others will have
difficult duplicating. Accordingly, it is necessary to address each component
of the VRIO framework separately below.
1. Valuable
A resource is considered valuable when “it enables an organization to
increase revenues by taking advantage of opportunities in the organization’s
environment, to reduce costs by neutralizing threats in the organization’s
environment, or to do both.”110 The resource must “enable [the] firm to
exploit environmental opportunities or neutralize environmental threats.”111
In this regard, the focus of “valuable” is strictly limited to recognition of
financial value to the organization. The concept of public goods within the
VRIO framework is only recognized to the extent that their creation increases
the individual organization’s revenue, decrease costs, or both. Although an
individual law school can certainly justify creating public goods as part of its
broader mission, it should not be confused with providing for the economic
sustainability of the law school.
As applied to U.S. law schools, an example of a valuable opportunity
would be to develop a reputation for producing law graduates who are
exceptionally prepared to practice something like “oil and gas law in
multinational corporations.” As a result, if the legal education of a particular
law school can tailor their offerings to fully reach out to future oil and gas
corporate lawyers, the offering would most certainly be perceived as valuable
to a discrete segment of potential students. Importantly, the value is in the
result—not necessarily in the means by which the result is achieved. In this
regard, it is important to remember that “most people who attend law school
expect to end up with a decent standard of living [among other things] that
exceeds what they would have attained without the degree.”112 Therefore,
considerably less value exists in simply offering a course on Oil and Gas
Law—as opposed to producing law graduates who are exceptionally
prepared to practice oil and gas law in multinational corporations.
For these same reasons, a much more difficult question exists regarding
the value of legal scholarship. Whether or not scholarship (i.e. faculty
research and writing) is valuable within the VRIO framework greatly
depends upon the use to which the scholarship is put by the particular law
school. Is there a nexus between the scholarship and increased revenue for
the school? Does the scholarship—for the individual law school—“enable[]
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[the individual law school] to increase revenues . . . to reduce costs . . . or to
do both”?113
Undoubtedly, some elite U.S. law schools could properly conclude that
their scholarship is valuable under the VRIO framework. The reputation for
leading scholarship is likely to attract some students in applying to the
particular school.114 It may also result in an increased receipt of some types
of research grants. Likewise, some other U.S. law schools that are known for
niche specialties could also conclude that their niche-related scholarship is
also valuable under the VRIO framework.
However, other legal scholarship may present some challenging
questions. For instance, does the cost of producing the scholarship actually
exceed the revenues that can reasonably be identified? This could easily be
determined by surveying current and past students about the criteria they
used in originally selecting the particular law school. For current purposes,
let it suffice to state that scholarship provides a perfect example of how value
within an institutionalized organization does not necessarily equate with
value within the VRIO framework.
2. Rare
The second component of the VRIO framework is whether or not the
resource is rare. Just because something is valuable does not necessarily
mean that it is also rare. “[I]f a particular resource or capability is controlled
by numerous competing firms, then that resource is unlikely to be a source of
competitive advantage for any one of them.”115 For instance, water is
certainly valuable. It has multiple uses and is necessary for life on earth.
However, in most places on the globe, water is abundant. Ordinarily, it is not
rare—unless some additional unique aspects are perceived by consumers
(making it rare again).
For instance, in 1994 Pepsi “invested $3 million to purify municipal tap
water in Wichita, Kansas—creating the Aquafina brand . . . by 2003,
Aquafina brought in $8.1 billion for Pepsi.”116 In this case, the purification
and adjustments to taste corresponded to market recognition of water quality
concerns.117 Bottled water also addressed rising demands for convenience
113
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and portability.118 The combination converted a generic commodity into a
valuable brand.
For this reason, a firm resource is considered rare “when the number of
organizations which possess, and/or are capable of possessing, the strategy
are less than the number of organizations that is required for perfectly
competitive conditions among a set of competitors or potential
competitors.”119 In many ways, the concept of rarity is just another way
asking if there is any unmet demand for the particular resource. As such,
rarity can be caused by various factors.
As applied broadly to U.S. law schools, the historically poor adaptations
by institutionalized competitors suggests that there should be multiple areas
where innovative market-focused offerings could be considered rare. For
instance, take virtually any specific career where a law degree is considered
to be beneficial.120 All that would be necessary for an individual law school
to create a rare program would be to assemble—and communicate—a clearly
targeted (but difficult to copy) program thoroughly serving that specific
career. Objectively, this should be far easier than trying to sell a twentyounce bottle of water for two dollars!
Note that simply creating a certificate or assembling courses does not, by
itself, create rarity. Unless backed by truly scarce faculty expertise and/or
other difficult-to-copy characteristics (that are appreciated by the customer—
the students), certificates are easy to copy. What is necessary is for the
individual law school to communicate to the market how the offering is
unique, and then take steps that make the offering more difficult to copy. So,
for instance, if the occupation is unique to the law school’s location (such as
federal government and Washington, D.C.), the law school could include
internships and active participation by professionals affiliated with the local
resource. Additional steps could be taken to make the experience even more
distinctive by securing unique—and ideally exclusive—partnerships.
Another way to look at rarity within the VRIO framework is to realize
that, prior to the economic shock in 2008, all forms of legal education were
perceived as being rare. This essentially supported the institutionalization of
legal education. It was only after the shock that the rarity of a traditional
form of legal education came into question for a sizable number of potential
law school applicants.121 For the weaker schools, it is now questionable
118
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whether there is any unmet demand for the particular traditional resource.122
Consequently, prospective law students “are less inclined to maintain
loyalties; they are seeking value from organizations, and are demanding that
organizations provide a good reason for customers to deal with them.”123
This has the unpleasant result of both reducing the demand for legal
education as well as increasing the price sensitivity—unless individual law
schools can successfully create their own rarity that is perceived and valued
by students.
Even if their resource is both valuable and rare, the fact remains that the
individual organization may not necessarily be able to recognize any
sustainable competitive advantage unless the resource is also difficult to
copy. It must be inimitable (or imperfectly imitable).
3. Inimitable
A firm resource is imperfectly imitable when other organizations “are not
able to imitate [them] . . . through duplication or substitution.”124 Generally
speaking, barriers to imitation reduce to unique history, causal ambiguity, or
social complexity.125 However, once again, the focus is on the perceptions of
the customer rather than merely on the technical differences between the
competitors. It is not enough to be different; the differences must be
perceived and valued by potential customers—potential students. In fact, it
is even arguable that the customer perceptions may be more important than
technical reality.
For example, does anyone seriously think that there are major
substantive differences between Coke and Pepsi? Nonetheless, each of the
brands has significantly different perceptions by the consuming public. Each
brand has achieved “imperfect imitability,” even though the underlying
the systemic failures of American legal education even more glaring and inequitable
to law students.”).
122
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offering is quite similar and generic brands often taste quite similar. This is a
lesson that many U.S. law schools have yet to learn.
In applying inimitability to U.S. law schools, a number of patterns
quickly emerge. For instance, the inimitability of most leading law schools
is at least partially the result of a unique history.126 History is difficult to
imitate—even if the offerings of newer schools are technically superior. Just
as with Coke and Pepsi, history provides a unique patina to the brand of older
law schools. Moreover, the ability of lesser known law schools to “catch up”
is made even harder where institutional pressures undermine competition
between constituent organizations. In these situations, the institutionalization
of legal education reinforces the alignment—and ranking—of constituent
schools. In the process, institutionalization reinforces the status quo.
As compared to imitability based on history, a slightly easier source of
inimitability to overcome is “causal ambiguity.”127 This exists where the
exact means of achieving a particular outcome is obscure. For instance, if
the recipe for a particular cookie is a trade secret, competitors will hopefully
encounter difficulties replicating the cookie’s flavor. The relationship
between the inputs and outputs is unclear.
As applied to law schools, causal ambiguity can relate to the means of
achieving a particular distinction that is valued by potential law students. For
instance, if a particular law school consistently produces trial advocacy teams
that win national competitions (and this is presumably both valuable and
rare), then the ambiguity can be a source of inimitability. The same situation
could also be at work in the previous example of a reputation for producing
great oil and gas attorneys. There could be causal ambiguity in explaining
the apparent preponderance and success of a law school’s graduates in a
particular industry.128
A last source of imperfect imitability is “socially complex”
relationships.129 Examples of socially complex relationships include: “the
interpersonal relations among managers in [an organization], [an
organization’s] culture, [an organization’s] reputation among suppliers, and
[an organization’s reputation among] customers [and consumers].”130 As
with causal ambiguity, the contribution of social complexity is that it makes
copying more difficult.
For law schools, a socially complex basis for inimitability is simply
developing a reputation for serving a particular niche exceptionally well.
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Although the benefit of the end result (reputation in the niche) is hopefully
obvious, the exact steps necessary to achieve it are hopefully quite obscure.
Of course, in order to achieve inimitability, it is imperative that law schools
do far more than just announce a certificate or a new course. Other law
schools will copy the innovation as soon as the certificate or course appears
to be successful. A similar problem exists with simply offering a combined
J.D./M.B.A. program. Any law school can partner with a business school to
offer a similar program. There must be more complexity that is more
difficult for competitors to copy.
For instance, if a law school offers J.D./M.B.A. joint degrees to students
interested in entrepreneurship, the law school could consciously pursue
social complexity and causal ambiguity while developing a long-term goal of
developing a unique history. This process could start by identifying the
characteristics of good entrepreneur attorneys. Developing those skills could
then be integrated into the curriculum. The law school could survey its own
graduates to ask about their experiences and recommendations. The law
school could start a writing competition on entrepreneurial skills and the
practice of law. The law school’s law review could issue annual awards for
best papers on law practice by sole practitioners. The law school could offer
CLE programs, open to current law students, on building a law practice. The
law school could even offer a cross-listed course on entrepreneurship—open
to both law and business students. On the faculty side, the law school could
recruit faculty with experience and recognition in entrepreneurship law. All
of this would foster inimitability through social complexity. Over time, the
law school would develop a unique history-based inimitable reputation for
producing exceptional “entrepreneurial lawyers.” All of this would then
need to be disseminated to potential students and employers.
As a caveat, it is important to note that all of the efforts to create
inimitability must be based upon both implementation and communication.
It is not enough to do something outstanding if no one knows about it. At the
same time, it is also not enough to advertise a program, but not deliver the
desirable performance. It is only after the effort has been successfully
implemented that the resulting reputation becomes difficult for other law
schools to imitate. As long as the law school continues to meaningfully
support the reputation, the innovation will remain partially inimitable. In
contrast, if the law school fails to implement a quality plan and provide the
necessary resources, the benefits will quickly evaporate.
For all of the above reasons, one of the most critical components in the
VRIO framework is the capability of the specific organization to successfully
implement. This leads directly to the last component of the VRIO
framework—organization.
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4. Organization
Even if an opportunity is valuable, rare, and inimitable, it is still
worthless if the organization is unable to execute. In this regard,
organization relates to the organizational capability to implement. It refers to
how “the organization’s formal reporting structures, management styles,
explicit management control systems and compensation policies [are]
designed to exploit the full competitive potential of its strategy. . . .”131
Stated otherwise, the VRIO framework requires that the organization has the
capability to effectively implement over time.
In fact, the capability of an organization to execute is critical for an
organization to recognize any of the benefits from the VRIO framework. As
it happens, this challenge is also integral to the previous discussions on
behavioral economics and institutional theory. Without the ability to
execute, without the processes to make sure that strategies are implemented,
there is no ability to achieve any sustainable competitive advantage. It is
specifically for this reason that the remaining portions of this Article focus
on the processes connected with successful execution. The next Section
addresses the role of strategic planning in law schools (which assure
alignment with both the external environment and the law school’s mission).
The last Section then proposes a change-process model tailored for use by
law schools. Together, they are intended to increase the likelihood of
specific law schools successfully deploying their capabilities to meaningfully
adapt and execute.
C. Law School Strategic Planning
As noted previously, some law schools may reasonably believe that the
existing approach to legal education is “fundamentally fine.”132 However,
the pursuit of better market alignment does not necessarily conflict with the
core mission and values of any specific law school. A law school can
actually both fulfill its existing mission and create a sustainable competitive
advantage. A law school can pursue its noble goals while implementing
distinctive and meaningful programs consistent with the VRIO framework.
To do this, all the law school needs to do is operate “strategically.”
According to Igor Ansoff, “strategic” means “‘pertaining to the relation
between the firm and its environment.’”133 By seeking to better align an
organization with its external environment, strategy is critical to the long-
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term success of most organizations.134 Economically speaking, strategy
enables organizations to deploy their resources in a way that profitably and
uniquely creates customer value. If properly implemented, strategic planning
also assures that the potential innovations align with the individual law
school’s mission and values. Strategic planning can assure both the
continued noble purpose of legal education as well as the benefits of
meaningful change.
In 1981, Kotler and Murphy135 specifically applied strategic planning
principles to organizations in higher learning. In this regard, Kotler and
Murphy expressly recognized that in education the creation of unique value
still begins with the identification of marketing opportunities. Marketing
opportunity for educational institutions was defined as “‘an attractive area of
relevant action in which a particular organization is likely to enjoy superior
competitive advantage[] . . . . An opportunity can be assessed in terms of two
basic dimensions: (1) its potential attractiveness as measured by the amount
of revenue or other results that an organization might value and (2) the
probability that the institution will be successful in developing the
opportunity.”136
By providing for “other results that an organization might value,” Kotler
and Murphy expressly provided for alternative value considerations beyond
just revenue.
However, practically speaking, alternative value for
organizations in higher education needs to be evaluated in addition to
potential revenue—not instead of potential revenue. Otherwise, the longterm economic viability of the individual educational organization would be
completely left to chance. Accordingly, in evaluating different potential
market opportunities (specifically looking for VRIO characteristics), Kotler
and Murphy essentially suggest that schools start by conducting what is
commonly known as a “SWOT” analysis.137
A SWOT analysis is an effort to better understand the competitive
landscape in which the organization exists, and then to determine where,
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within that context, the organization can best compete.138 This involves
marrying a survey of the external market conditions used by the marketbased view, with the existing and potential firm capabilities used by the
resource-based view.139 As a practical matter, this involves first considering
all of the potential external market opportunities and threats.140
For example, for law schools, potential opportunities would inherently
include providing legal educational services to students interested in
becoming licensed attorneys. This could include students interested in
practicing law within a particular state. It also could include international
students interested in becoming licensed in the United States, but practicing
law in their home country (or practicing in the United States while serving
entities from their home country). This could then be broken down further
by the various types of lawyer practices that already exist. However, the
analysis should not stop here.
Opportunity-wise, the external market should also include students who
want to receive a law license, but want to work in an industry or profession
that does not require a law license. An easy way to identify these industries
or professions would be to survey recent graduates employed in fields where
a J.D. is considered advantageous, but not required. Surveying students
pursuing combined degrees could also help to identify these fields: What are
the students planning to do with their combined degrees? What are the
intended benefits of the degree? Lastly, the external market should consider
law students who ultimately secure jobs where a law degree is not deemed
advantageous—as well as potential law students who have decided not to
pursue a law degree: What are their goals? How do these groups of
individuals perceive the value of a legal education. Would they consider a
degree other than a J.D.? How would they value it? How large is the
segment? What would be necessary to better serve their needs?
Once the external market has been surveyed, the next step is to determine
the existing and potential threats that exist for each segment identified as a
potential opportunity. For instance, there would be numerous threats if the
opportunity is as generic as “students interested in becoming licensed
attorneys.” Almost by definition, all law schools would be existing
competitors. For this reason, it is important to dig much deeper.
For instance, what if there is a segment of insurance adjusters who value
obtaining a J.D. but do not want to practice law? It might prove beneficial to
determine if there is any potential program certification that might be offered
by the current providers of the Chartered Life Underwriter (CLU) Certificate,
Chartered Property Casualty Underwriter (CPCU) Certificate, or Associate in
Claims (AIC) Certificate. If not, is there a possibility for an individual law
138
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school to partner with the certificate providers? What other law schools
already offer similar services? Where are they located and where do their
students originate? The process of identifying actual and potential threats
should be repeated for each opportunity. Additionally, it should be
determined if groups of opportunities naturally group together. If so, threats
should be examined for the groups as well.
At the same time, the specific law school needs to evaluate its existing
and potential resources “as providing a key to what it can accomplish.”141
These resources can be either internal (in the form of faculty expertise) or
external (in the form of alumni networks, unique geographic benefits or
special industry access) in aligning with potential market demand. A
comparison of the potential opportunities and available organizational
resources enables the educational organization to evaluate its own strengths
and weaknesses.142 In particular, “[t]he school should pay attention primarily
to those strengths in which it possesses a differential advantage [to other
schools], that is, it can outperform competitors on that dimension.”143 When
considered as a whole, the individual law school should have a much better
idea of the attractiveness of the identified opportunities as well as the
probability that the efforts would prove successful.
“The theory is that an organization should pursue goals, opportunities,
and strategies that are suggested by, or congruent with, its strengths and
avoid those where its resources would be too weak.”144 However, at all
times, options should be evaluated within the context of the external market
opportunities and their alignment with the appropriate organizational
distinctive competencies. “Distinctive competencies are those resources and
abilities in which the organization is especially strong.”145
Once the school has completed its SWOT analysis, the next step is for
the school to formulate (or reformulate) its organizational goals. This starts
by re-examining the organization’s mission. The mission statement “defines
what an organization is, why it exists, [and] its reason for being.” 146 This is
actually the heart of the problem. In many ways, the mission statement
141
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overlaps with the process of institutionalization. The greater the institutional
pressures, the greater the likelihood that the individual organization will
ignore meaningful consideration of its own mission statement. After all, in
institutionalized industries, the institution—rather than the individual
organization—largely dictates what the organization is and why it exists.
However, through the use of institutional entrepreneurship, the
organizational focus can at least temporarily shift back to the organization’s
mission statement.
Theoretically, the function of the mission statement is to communicate
to internal stakeholders—like the faculty and staff—why the organization
exists.147 By comparing the identified market opportunities, the initial
SWOT analysis, and the mission statement, a law school has a clear process
for either adjusting its existing mission to account for the new opportunities,
or rejecting potential opportunities because they are outside the purposes for
which the organization exists. Either way, the nobility of the legal education
is protected.
Of course, the process of formally reconsidering the mission statement
provides an ideal opportunity to determine the extent to which faculty and
staff have internalized the existing mission of the organization. If the faculty
or staff do not even know (or cannot agree upon) the contents of the school’s
existing mission, it is critical to pause and thoroughly revisit the issue. This
could be the result of either institutionalization or bounded rationality by the
faculty. Clarifying these issues will provide faculty with the opportunity to
consciously reconsider some of the organizational assumptions. However,
consensus on the organizational mission is essential. Otherwise, even
without any institutional pressures, it will be virtually impossible to
consistently prioritize opportunities.148
Next, having made sure to align the results of the SWOT analysis, and
the revised mission statement, Kotler and Murphy clearly set forth the
remaining steps of the strategic planning process. First, a prioritized list of
primary outcomes can be established.149 In other words, using the VRIO
framework and other considerations, what opportunities will the organization
pursue and which ones are most important? How many opportunities have
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been selected? What are their relative priorities to each other? What are the
estimated probabilities of success?
Second, individual goals need to be developed to explain how the
objectives will be measured.150 This involves setting one or more goals for
each objective. What goals will be used to determine if the objective has
been achieved? For instance, if a law school is going to develop an oil and
gas program, how many students need to be recruited in order for the
program to be considered a success? How high should the LSAT scores and
grade point averages of the incoming students be for it to be considered a
success? How high should subsequent student employment rates be in order
for the program to be considered a success? How far out after graduation
should the employment rates be measured?
Third, once the goals have been preliminarily determined, one or more
strategies must be selected in order to achieve each of the stated goals.151 For
instance, how will the law school generally go about recruiting students to
the new oil and gas program? What generally needs to be in the program for
the goals to be achieved? Generally, where and how does the program need
to be promoted? What are the general approaches to link the program
content to the students who will value it the most (and have the best
credentials and/or employment capabilities)?
Fourth, for each strategy or group of strategies, specific operational plans
(tactics) should be developed to achieve the corresponding objectives.152 For
instance, in developing the oil and gas certificate program, which oil and gas
companies will be contacted to determine the ideal content of such a
program? How will the program be specifically promoted? How much will
each of the plans cost to implement? Who will supply the resources?
And lastly, the organization must provide a mechanism to continuously
monitor the implementation in order to facilitate any necessary
adjustments.153 In other words, who is responsible for monitoring progress
and to whom do they report? How frequently will progress be measured?
Although the specific process of strategy development might at first
appear complicated, the actual task remains quite simple: find ways for your
organization to profitably deliver superior value to existing and potential
students.
This can be achieved by: using one set of institutional
entrepreneurs to engage and convene faculty; empowering another set of
institutional entrepreneurs to use the VRIO framework to identify distinct
and meaningful opportunities for distinctive and meaningful change; and
then applying strategic planning principles to select, prioritize, and
150

See id. at 480–81.
See id. at 481.
152
See id. at 483–87. Although Kotler and Murphy do not delve into tactics, the
operational planning is a common component as included in this paper.
153
See id. at 483–88.
151

282

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 16, No. 2

implement opportunities that are consistent with both the external market and
the mission of the individual law school. By way of further clarification, in
the last Section, all of these aspects are integrated into a single process model
for individual law schools.
V. A LAW SCHOOL CHANGE PROCESS MODEL
By combining all of the topics discussed previously, institutional theory,
behavioral economics, and management theory can be combined into a
generic process model that significantly increases the likelihood of
innovative success by individual law schools. Although part of the proposed
change process model is based upon Dorado’s 2005 article Institutional
Entrepreneurship, Partaking and Convening,154 the proposed model does not
track Dorado’s article exactly. Most notably, Dorado’s article worked across
three separate dimensions (resource mobilization, agency, and opportunity)
to discuss “institutional change profiles.”155 For current purposes, the
proposed model focuses only on resource mobilization (but incorporates
some of the other considerations presented by the other dimensions as well).
This dramatically reduces the scope and complexity of both the current
Article and the proposed model. To make the model simpler, the proposed
model also relies upon components from an earlier version of Dorado’s
article.156
A. The Participants
As proposed, the change process model involves the coordinated
participation of five entities—each playing a specific role in facilitating
appropriate and successful organizational change. The five coordinated
entities are: the Dean, the Entire Law Faculty, the Conveners Team, an
Internal Leveraging Team (Innovators), and an External Leveraging Team
(Catalysts). Each entity or team is discussed below. The participants are then
coordinated across seven stages—all with the intended goal of achieving
successful organizational change.
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1. The Dean
The role of the Dean is to support and initiate (or reinitiate) the change
process model. In this regard, the Dean starts the process of constructing
“chains of action” within the individual law school “with at least some prefabricated links.”157 This means determining the paths and key personnel
within the law faculty most likely to successfully champion meaningful
change. It also involves helping to identify any limitations on the entire
process, and to frame the process in a way that addresses both bounded
rationality as well as bounded willpower.
Personnel-wise, the Dean needs to select one or two respected law
faculty members with the ability of convincing the overall law faculty of the
“desirability and viability of collaborating to jumpstart the development of a
solution to a problem.”158 These respected faculty members need to be
“politically skilled actors” who are instrumental in “bridging unaware,
unsure or skeptical actors to explore the possibilities of cooperation.”159
However, at the same time, the Dean should be careful not to predetermine or
endorse any particular plans or ideas. The focus is on simply starting to build
links that channel “action through the shape and organization of those
links,”160 rather than by predetermining the ends to which they are put.
In regard to the overall proposed process, the Dean is the individual with
the greatest knowledge of the limitations imposed on the law school by the
University and other key institutions. For this reason, by the time the process
is initiated, the Dean should be able to clarify any University-related
restrictions on potential innovations. The Dean should determine and
communicate any express institutional limitations on the change process as
early as possible.
2. The Entire Law Faculty
In regard to the proposed change process, the law faculty is important for
several reasons. First, as previously noted, some law schools may rationally
decide that meaningful change is unnecessary. The sooner it is determined
that this is the case, the sooner the process can shift to discussing other
matters. There is no need to pursue meaningful change if the faculty
overwhelmingly sees no need for it.
A second reason that the law faculty is important to the proposed change
process is that institutional and behavioral forces are often internalized by the
law faculty. The greater the law faculty’s awareness of the challenges posed
by institutionalization and behavioral economics, the less resistant the faculty
157
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will be to change. In fact, by raising awareness of institutionalization and
behavioral economics within the entire law faculty, individual faculty
members will be more likely to meaningfully participate in the change
process and support the empowerment of focused institutional
entrepreneurship groups.
A third reason that the law faculty is important is that they inherently
represent the most valuable resource of any law school. Without their
engagement, contribution, and flexibility, the task of creating meaningful and
distinctive programs becomes significantly more difficult—if not impossible.
3. The Conveners Team
Besides the Dean and the entire law faculty, the key mechanism for
successfully achieving change is the Conveners Team.161 The purpose of the
Conveners Team is to convene the entire law faculty to specifically provide
process, credibility, and legitimacy.162 At the same time, the Conveners
Team will manage the groups charged with Leveraging, discussed below. In
this way, the Conveners Team will increase the chances that the Leveraging
groups will identify opportunities that are acceptable to the entire faculty.
Given the special importance of the Conveners Team, the recommended
process model limits the role of the Dean to only picking one or two of the
initial core members. This recommendation assumes that the participation by
the Dean will introduce a top-down bias or other resistance from the general
faculty. Since the goal of the process model is to obtain full participation
from the general faculty, the preferable engagement is bottom-up, rather than
top-down. Of course, if the individual faculty has a collegial relationship
with the specific Dean, this rule certainly can be relaxed as appropriate.
Assuming the Dean is not actively involved, the initially selected core
members of the Conveners Team should then bootstrap the selection of the
remaining members of the Conveners Team. At all times, the Conveners
Team should consist of the most respected, unbiased, senior members of the
law faculty. As their name implies, the Conveners Team serves as the
convening linkage between the general law faculty and the innovative
process represented by the other teams (discussed next). In this regard, the
Conveners Team should be sensitive to faculty questions regarding
uncertainty of outcomes as well as structuring the process into manageable
pieces. Once this is achieved, the Conveners Team needs to forcefully
resolve limitations to bounded willpower. Faculty commitment to the
process is critical.
In assuring the ability of the Conveners Team to facilitate the success of
the entire process, one or more members of the Conveners Team is expected
161
162
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to monitor each of the other two teams. Their involvement is not to manage
the other teams but to facilitate focus, efficiency, and consensus throughout
the entire process. The Conveners Team is also expected to supplement the
“pre-fabricated” linkages163 identified by the Dean that will enable the
successful implementation of whatever changes are recommended. This
should consist of careful selection of all other team members who are
appropriate for the respective tasks and committed to working in a collegial
environment. Where necessary, the Conveners Team will also need to
identify any sources of general faculty resistance and take appropriate
measures. Ultimately, the job of the Conveners Team is to provide unbiased
recommendations to the general faculty regarding the adoption of the
proposed change strategies. The Conveners Team should manage the entire
change process through the point where specific opportunities are (hopefully)
approved for implementation by the entire faculty.
4. The Internal Leveraging Team (Innovators)
Beside the Conveners Team, the next key component of the proposed
change process is to assemble a highly entrepreneurial team from within the
law school to identify, promote, and leverage specific opportunities.164 This
team consists of the Innovators. This team should consist of externally
focused, market-aware, faculty and staff from admissions, placement, and
alumni affairs. Staff from each of these offices should have extensive
knowledge about the students’ perceived value of existing offerings as well
as knowledge of common complaints and potential additional offerings. To
the extent possible, creative law faculty with the ability to cooperatively
work on multidisciplinary teams should be central to the team dynamics.
The meaningful involvement (though not necessarily control) of faculty is
necessary to increase the likelihood of adoption.
The Innovator Team should be extremely creative, strategic, and
encourage active endorsement of their recommended opportunities across the
general faculty.165 The Innovator Team should be encouraged to freely share
and refine their ideas. In addition, they should be charged with primary
responsibility for finding promising opportunities that challenge the
assumptions of the organization.
The Innovator Team must be comfortable applying the VRIO framework
to potential opportunities for the individual law school. In this way, the ideas
promoted by the Innovators Team should be expected to lead to quantifiable
increases in enrollment, and provide a basis for sustainable advantage
relative to other law schools. In order for the Innovators to be successful,
163
164
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they will need to do far more than just brainstorm. Success will require
research and formulation of strategies that will stop other law schools from
simply copying new innovations. Ultimately, the job of the Innovator Team
is to creatively identify and promote substantive opportunities for the
individual law school that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and organizationally
appropriate.
5. The External Leveraging Team (Catalysts)
Sometimes, even motivated entrepreneurs are limited by their
occupational or employment role. Consequently, in addition to the (internal)
Innovators Team, it is necessary to provide an additional external reality
check by virtue of the External Leveraging Team—the Catalysts. The
Catalyst Team consists of external stakeholders with a commitment to
quality legal education and the success of the individual law school. At the
same time, the Catalyst Team should consist of individuals with knowledge
of potential resources beyond the law school. As with the Innovators, the
Catalyst Team should have a strategic perspective and be free to actively
recruit support for ideas that they believe would be most beneficial for the
law school. However, their perspective is fundamentally from the outside-in.
Except for input from a member from the Conveners Team, the Catalyst
Team should completely consist of individuals who do not work for the law
school or in education. They should represent a broad array of creative
individuals with external knowledge of potential law school opportunities for
distinction.
To some extent, the Catalyst Team can serve as a sounding board for the
Innovator Team. In the process, they can provide initial market feedback on
the various Innovator ideas while contributing their own perspectives.
Without the identification of quality opportunities, the benefit of the entire
process will be minimized. Ultimately, the primary value of the Catalyst
Team is the provision of input from external stakeholders as to how to
improve perceived market value, sustainability, and resources to support and
prioritize the opportunities. At the same time, the involvement of a
Convening Team member within the Catalyst Team is meant to further
shepherd the process along with the intention of producing solid
recommendations back to the entire law faculty.
B. The Stages of a Change Process Model
Having described the specific role for each of the five key entities, this
Section discusses the related seven-stage change process model.166 Within
166
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the model, each previously discussed entity plays either a primary or
secondary role in achieving distinctive and meaningful change. An overview
of the model is provided immediately below with each stage discussed in
greater detail.
By way of overview, the seven-stage model assumes that the field of
legal education has been institutionalized and is subject to the limitations of
behavioral economics. However, the model also assumes that the change
being sought can be achieved within the currently existing ABA rules. As
such, there is no inherently obvious need for inter-organizational
coordination. The proposed model seeks to empower and coordinate
institutional entrepreneurs within individual law schools to convene and
engage the entire law faculty in an endorsed change process.
Once the entire faculty has endorsed the change process, the proposed
change model utilizes both internal and external institutional entrepreneurs in
leveraging new opportunities for distinctive and meaningful change.
Consistent with the rest of this Article, the proposed model does not
specifically endorse any particular plans. Instead, the internal Innovator
Team is charged with working cooperatively with the external Catalysts to
identify unique opportunities. Together, the two teams apply the VRIO
framework to the available resources of their specific law school to make
specifically tailored recommendations.
The Conveners are next charged with helping to integrate the
recommendations within an unbiased strategic planning process that involves
the entire law faculty. In this way, the Conveners will facilitate the entire
faculty in specifically selecting some or all of the recommended
opportunities for implementation. “None” is not an option. At the same
time, the involvement of the entire faculty will assure that the recommended
opportunities also align with the mission of the individual law school. It is
only after the entire faculty has endorsed specific change opportunities that
the Dean will initiate implementation and monitoring of the plan in
conjunction with Innovator team members. Once the primary stages have
been completed the Dean resets the entire process to refine, revisit, or
otherwise pursue additional change for future cycles.
By way of further clarification, it should be noted that the individual
stages of the model may require significantly different amounts of time,
effort, and preparation to complete at different law schools. In some stages,
such as those involving the entire law faculty, it is likely that multiple
meetings and flexibility will be necessary to achieve optimal results. In some
instances, it will be necessary to modify the proposed model. Depending
upon specific circumstances, it may be necessary to more deeply engage

to present a clearer process by which to apply the more abstract concepts discussed
earlier and to achieve change within individual law schools.
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university officials, the student body, employers of graduates, or bar
associations. Likewise, in Stage 2, a number of steps may either be
completely unnecessary or require much greater depth (depending upon the
perspectives and dynamics of the particular law school faculty). Individual
law schools should feel free to adapt the model as necessary to achieve the
intended goal of the particular stage.

1. Stage 1: Initiation
In Stage 1, the law school Dean identifies the overall goals and
limitations for the current efforts and clarifies its role within the broader
strategic planning process. For example, if this is not the first time that the
law school has engaged the change process model, the Dean may wish to
comment on the output from previous efforts. The Dean may also wish to
suggest changes to the current cycle to address specific issues previously
encountered, or supply some basic information or other data to help in the
success of the overall process. However, in all instances, the Dean should
provide a mechanism for determining the minimal success for each stage and
the entire process. For instance, if distinctive and meaningful change is
being pursued, the Dean should indicate that, for example, “at least five
viable ideas should be approved by this process for implementation.” Zero
should never be an option.
Once the overall goals of the process are identified, the law school Dean
should select one or more energetic and widely-respected faculty who are
recognized by the general faculty for their balanced and unbiased character
and commitment. The selected faculty members should be fully informed of
the entire change model and know exactly how the effort relates to the
broader strategic planning process. These leaders should be “quick to
appreciate the beneficial impact of mutual exchange, proficient at scanning
the environment surrounding the collaboration, and skilled in appraising the
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consequences of contemplated future actions.”167 These leaders also should
be attuned to the resistance mechanisms typical of both institutional theory
and behavioral economics.
The core faculty initially selected by the Dean will then independently
select the remaining members of the Conveners Team. Unless circumstances
dictate otherwise, the Dean should avoid any activities that would be viewed
as interference in the selection of the remaining members. Subsequent cycles
of the change model can then simply maintain the composition of earlier
team membership—with minimal adjustment as necessary.
Ideally, all members of the Conveners Team should have existing
relationships with the most creative members of the law school as well as
existing relationships with faculty actively involved in strategic planning for
the law school. If the individual law school does not have an existing and
meaningful strategic planning mechanism that integrates law faculty, one
should be established. Ideally, at least one member of the Conveners Team
should also have established relationships with key external individuals who
will ultimately constitute the Catalyst Team. The primary role of the
Conveners Team is to guide (but not manage) the developmental process of
ideas across the seven stages while maintaining the integrity of the process
for the general faculty. Part of this challenge is to identify areas of resistance
and proceed to address any concerns to the extent possible. At all times, it is
the responsibility of the Conveners Team to successfully guide the process to
deliver the predetermined number of specifically adopted opportunities (as
agreed upon by the entire faculty) for implementation and monitoring.
2. Stage 2: Convening
Having defined the general purpose, scope, and minimal deliverables,
and facilitated the formation of the Conveners Team in Stage 1, next the
Conveners Team is responsible for successfully convening the entire law
faculty to engage and endorse the overall change process. In this regard,
recall that convening is based upon the creation of a collaborative initiative
that “involves convincing [parties] of the desirability and viability of
collaborating to jumpstart the development of a solution to a problem.” 168
Convening requires “politically skilled actors” who are instrumental in
“bridging unaware, unsure or sceptical [sic] actors to explore the possibilities
of cooperation.”169 This includes minimizing the potential role of bounded
rationality, bounded willpower, and status quo bias throughout the process.
This is why there is a Conveners Team.
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In attempting to fully convene the faculty in the process, the exact
configuration of Stage 2 will likely vary across different law schools. The
configuration of Stage 2 may require pursuing one or more of three different
goals that depend upon the character, composition, and perspectives of the
law faculty at the specific school. It is up to the Conveners Team to
determine the optimal configuration for their specific school—with the goal
always being to successfully achieve meaningful change.
For instance, some of the law faculty might be unaware of the taken-forgranted assumptions that accompany institutionalization. This could cause
some of the law faculty to be less flexible in accepting innovative ideas. At
the same time, other law faculty might believe that individually meaningful
change is completely unnecessary. Yet other law faculty might simply desire
a greater understanding of the process of institutional entrepreneurship and
change. However, in all instances, the Conveners need to engage the
individual law faculty in ways most likely to influence them to endorse the
overall change process and commit to accepting at least some of the resulting
recommendations.
Assuming an individual law school deems it necessary to cover all of the
above-listed concerns, the specific goals for Stage 2 would be as follows:




First, to sensitize the law faculty regarding the impact of
institutionalization and behavioral considerations to their own
perspectives and decision-making;
Second, to determine the receptiveness of the law faculty of pursuing
meaningful and distinctive change by either increasing revenue or
reducing costs; and
Third, to engage law faculty by explaining the model and obtaining
their
endorsement
of
the
overall
change
process.

At all times, it is recommended that Conveners pursue their respective goals
in bite-sized pieces. This will reduce resistance due to bounded rationality.
The Conveners should feel free to adjust the number, duration, and
configuration of dedicated faculty meetings as necessary to maximize the
chances for success.
In pursuing the first of these goals (sensitivity to impact of
institutionalization and behavioral considerations), Conveners may wish to
begin by engaging the law faculty with questions that highlight some of their
own taken-for-granted assumptions170 in legal education. The goal of these
questions is not necessarily to resolve any issue, but to cause faculty to pause
and individually challenge some of their own assumptions, and appreciate
how it impacts their own decision-making. In the process, these questions
170
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(or questions like them) might highlight how taken-for-granted assumptions
can overshadow the ability of the law school to recognize innovative
opportunities.
Conveners could use various methods to assure active individual
participation. For instance, faculty could be asked to discuss their individual
answers to some or all of the questions below:
1. What are the outer limits of what constitutes the practice of law?
Why?
2. How have these changes been incorporated into U.S. legal
education?
3. What have been the biggest changes in the practice of law over the
last century?
4. What has NOT been incorporated into U.S. legal education? Why?
5. When it comes to legal education, who is the customer?
6. What is the broadest possible list of benefits that a law student
obtains by obtaining a legal education?
7. How does your individual school support each of these benefits?
8. What benefits does your school NOT support and why?
9. What complaints have you heard from students and recent graduates
about the existing educational offerings at your specific law school?
10. Are there any other groups of potential customers that could benefit
from what a legal education has to offer? Who?
11. Why has your law school NOT pursued extending benefits to these
additional potential customers?
12. What is the mission of your law school? How well do you think you
achieve this mission?
13. What could your school do better to fulfill its mission?
14. What is unique about the legal education provided at your individual
law school?
15. What could be unique, but is not currently, about the legal education
provided at your individual law school and why isn’t it being done?
16. What is the difference between the legal education provided by your
individual law school and your biggest competitor?
17. Who is your biggest competitor? Why do you consider them to be
your biggest competitor?
18. Why do so many potential law students rely upon the U.S. News and
World Report ranking of U.S. law schools?
19. Why do individual law students attend your law school?
20. Is there anything that could be done to increase the value of the legal
education offered by your law school? What?
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By asking questions like those presented above, law faculty should become
more conscious of the impacts of institutionalization in creating taken-forgranted assumptions.171 It should also naturally raise the prospect of faculty
engagement in meaningful change. In the process, the general faculty should
become more aware and receptive to a broader array of the opportunities that
they will be asked to approve in Stage 6.
Of course, there are other concerns that the Conveners may need to
address besides simply the awareness of institutionalization and limits of
behavioral economics. The second potential goal of Stage 2 is to determine
the extent to which individual law school faculty perceive of any need for
change. As such, the Conveners Team may wish to have the faculty answer
or discuss an additional series of preliminary core questions. One question
that the Conveners Team might wish to ask the law faculty might be: “Do
you (as a law faculty member) believe that your law school should pursue, as
a priority, either new sources of revenue or ways to reduce costs? Pick one:
YES or NO.”
If a significant number of law faculty respond “no”—ask why. It may be
that your law school is fortunate enough not to need to change—or your
faculty may suffer from either bounded rationality or bounded willpower. It
is important to clarify the situation.
The Conveners Team should listen closely. Before deciding how to
proceed, the Conveners Team should fully understand the perspectives of the
law faculty that believe change is unnecessary. The law faculty may know
something you do not; or the faculty may need to know something more.
Educate them if necessary. Given the importance of consensus building in
law school governance, it is important to have an open, sincere understanding
before deciding what to do next. In some contexts, the option to do nothing
might well be a legitimate alternative. The sooner the Conveners determine
this, the better.
However, assuming that a clear majority of law faculty agrees that doing
nothing is not an option, the next step is to solicit faculty feedback in
selecting the general priorities for change options. The Conveners Team
might therefore ask the law faculty a second question: “Should the primary
focus of organizational change be either cost-cutting or revenue growing?
Pick one: cost-cutting or revenue growth.”
At its most fundamental level, responding to an environmental shock
requires organizations to decide how to cope in ways that improves their
chances for survival. One way to do this is to determine how to increase
organizational value. It therefore helps to know if the faculty primarily
believes that their law school should cope by pursuing either Option 1—
reducing costs, or Option 2—increasing revenue. Notably, there is no Option
171
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3—do both (or neither). Once again, organizational focus requires clarity of
purpose and the pursuit of meaningful change has to start with commitment.
Moreover, it is assumed that all U.S. law schools are already trying to both
reduce costs and increase revenue. It is necessary for the faculty to clarify
what they believe should be the primary focus of significant change. Each
distinctive priority presents its own advantages and disadvantages. The
answers to these second questions should confirm the receptiveness of the
law faculty to pursuing meaningful and distinctive change by either
increasing revenue or reducing costs. The scope of the process can therefore
be adjusted accordingly.
With these issues resolved, the third and primary goal in Stage 2 is to
obtain faculty endorsement of the overall change process. For some law
faculty, all that may be necessary is to have them read a copy of this Article
and have them affirmatively vote to follow its process model. For other law
faculty, they may want to know a little more about the process for instituting
meaningful changes. Remember that individual uncertainty is a potential
source of status quo bias. It should be addressed accordingly. For faculty
who want to know even more about the underlying theory, these faculty
members should be encouraged to learn about the linked processes of
theorization, legitimization, and dissemination.
The first step—theorization—“involves both building a model of how
new practices and organizational forms work, and providing a justification
for them in the current and future contexts.”172 Through theorization, the
generalizability of the initial, narrow experiences of new alternatives is
subject to more rigorous investigation.173 The theorization informs the wider
population (in our case, the law faculty) about what, exactly, is the new
process and related alternatives. Theorization also provides the foundation
for comparison of the new alternatives to the old alternatives. In the process,
theorization enables justification of the new alternatives to the entire group of
socially connected individuals.174 Theorization thereby provides the rational
foundation for understanding the change model. In turn, it also facilitates
legitimization.175
Coincidentally, theorization also helps to address
decisional problems resulting from the cognitive limitations of bounded
rationality.
The second step is legitimization. Legitimacy is defined as “a
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of

172
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One of the potential uses for the present article is to provide the theoretical
basis—theorization—of the practical recommendations of the next Section.
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norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.”176 Legitimation is “the process of
linking new ideas, forms and practices to sets of values and logics that are
held in esteem by field actors and by the surrounding societal context.”177
Thus, subjecting new ideas or practices to theoretical development has the
additional benefit of enabling the new alternatives to be adopted and held in
greater regard by peers. In this way, innovations by “fringe” individuals or
entities are able to be tested and embraced by others. In the process, the new
alternatives obtain greater “moral legitimacy” both within and beyond the
group—in this case, within the law faculty.178
In the present model, the use of internal Innovators and external
Catalysts teams to use leveraging for recommended opportunities is the
conscious creation of “fringe” entities that have been sanctioned, in advance,
by the individual faculty. In this way, the entire faculty involvement in
reviewing and selecting opportunities as part of the subsequent strategic
planning process is consciously intended to provide a legitimization
mechanism for meaningful change. The entire faculty will be invited to
examine the output and decide which opportunities align with the law
school’s mission and are a source of sustainable competitive advantage.
Once the process and proposed alternatives have been subjected to
theorization and legitimation, the last step in integration is by way of
dissemination. Dissemination includes the speed, frequency, and patterns of
diffusion of the new alternative.179 This can be achieved through the iterative
application and review of outcomes from earlier efforts. In the present
model, the Conveners achieve this directly by holding one or more meetings
with faculty where the entire faculty is invited to discuss any concerns and
ultimately to select the opportunities that they approve. Moreover, with each
cycle of the proposed change process model, the faculty will be able to
reevaluate the cumulative value, context, and subsequent performance of
earlier decisions. Legitimation will increase with each cycle.
In sum then, there are several possible issues that the Conveners may
need to address as part of Stage 2. The Conveners should use their discretion
in determining the need and configuration of any efforts to address the
related goals. However, under all instances, it is critical that the Conveners
Teams get an unambiguous commitment from the general law faculty that
they will accept, support, and implement at least some amount of the output
of the change process model. The acceptable number can be selected by the
Dean in advance or left to future determination as some number greater than
zero. However, do not proceed to Stage 3 unless and until there is full
176
Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional
Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 574 (1995).
177
C.R. HININGS ET AL., supra note 156, at 312.
178
Id. at 310 (citing Schuman, supra note 176).
179
Id. at 311.
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faculty endorsement of the change process model endorsed by the Conveners
Team.
3. Stage 3: Identify & Refine Opportunities for Leveraging
Having obtained overall faculty engagement and endorsement for the
change process model, in Stage 3 the Conveners Team proceeds to recruit
members of both the Innovator Team and the Catalyst Team. The purpose of
both teams is to identify optimal opportunities that comply with the VRIO
framework. The job of both teams is to creatively identify distinctive and
meaningful opportunities where the individual law school can create a
sustainable competitive advantage. While the Innovators and Catalysts are
doing this, the role of the Conveners Team is to establish a timeline for
completion of this stage, determine the form of the specific deliverables, and
continue to engage the general faculty.
In order to increase the likely value of the deliverables, members of the
Innovator Team should consist of the most creative, outward looking faculty
and staff. By design, the Innovator Team should consist of individuals
internal to the law school who are especially committed to finding and
pursuing better opportunities. These should be the individuals from within
the law school most capable of improving the fit of the law school with the
external market and correcting problems with the implementation of existing
programs.
Once the Innovator Team has been recruited, they should be immediately
turned loose. Let the Innovators Team establish their own approach to
leadership and management. Of course, some predetermined target number
of opportunities should be provided to the Team. This should help the
Innovator Team to avoid being overwhelmed. Any additional ideas
identified by the Innovators Team can be saved and then used in future
initiatives.
The Innovator Team should be encouraged to talk with existing students
and recent graduates. It should also be encouraged to talk with current and
potential employers of recent graduates. The goal is to creatively formulate
valuable, rare, inimitable, and organizationally appropriate offerings that can
be adopted and implemented by the individual law school. At all times, the
Innovator Team should remain cognizant of identifying opportunities that
have a reasonable probability of providing a sustainable competitive
advantage. The Innovator Team should be given a clear budget for doing
market research and evaluating viable strategies to recruit more (or better)
students.
The Innovator Team should also be permitted to group
opportunities based upon potential complementary benefits. At the same
time, the Innovator Team should estimate the probability of success in
pursuing each opportunity. The Innovator Team should determine the
amount and type of resources that would be necessary to make the selected
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strategies a successful reality. All of this should help the Innovator team
ultimately decide which opportunities to recommend, endorse, and promote.
While the Innovators Team proceeds to start pursuing opportunities, the
Conveners Team should begin to organize externally engaged parties to
constitute the “Catalyst Team.” In this regard, the Dean, alumni affairs,
fundraising, and members of the Innovator Team may be able to recommend
Catalyst Team members. However, the decision as to composition and size
of the Catalyst Team should ultimately rest with the Conveners Team.
During Stage 3, the purpose of the Catalyst Team is to provide a fresh
external perspective regarding ideas originated by the Innovator Team.
Therefore, although the Catalyst Team can start to formulate their own ideas
for how to improve curricular offerings, the Catalyst Team is intended to
supplement the efforts of the Innovators. However, it is important that the
Catalyst Team remains involved as a perpetual external reality check on the
process. It is up to the Conveners Team to assure that optimal balance is
maintained between the Innovator and Catalyst Teams.
Together, the Innovator and Catalyst Teams can evaluate the combined
upside benefits of all of the ideas. However, it is assumed that the Innovator
Team will have more time available to pursue its goals. Whenever meetings
are possible between the Innovators Team and the Catalyst Team, one of the
primary goals will be to compare their own thoughts about both the
opportunities and threats to those opportunities. The primary deliverable(s)
resulting from the combined discussions, besides a list of potential projects,
should be the foundation for strategic planning and a SWOT analysis in
Stage 4.
In this regard, given their day-to-day experiences, it may be tempting for
some Innovator and Catalyst Teams to view the entire process as an
impossible task. Fortunately, nothing could be further from the truth.
Although institutionalization and bounded rationality may have led to
perceptual blindness to opportunities, the opportunities still exist in
abundance. All that is necessary is for a particular law school to seriously
look for them, and then formulate and implement strategies creating VRIO
resources.
By way of initial generic guidance, consider the data listed below. All of
this suggests some level of unmet potential demand for legal education in
niche markets of various sizes. Additional detail is available by visiting the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS):
1. Of the 792,500 U.S. lawyers in 2016, 161,700 of them worked as
self-employed lawyers.180 By 2026, the number of self-employed
180

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
OCCUPATIONAL
OUTLOOK
HANDBOOK,
https://www.bls.gov/ooh/legal/lawyers.htm#tab-6
[https://perma.cc/9FV3-CDUP]
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lawyers is expected to increase slightly (7.4%) to 173,800.181 This
suggests that one area where law schools can look to add value is by
developing a sustainable strategy for producing law school graduates
that are successful as self-employed lawyers. The challenge will be
in configuring resources to comply with the VRIO framework.
2. Of the 792,500 U.S. lawyers in 2016, only 382,100 (48%) of them
were engaged in the direct provision of legal services for hire.182
This means that 52% of all lawyers in 2016 (about 410,000) were not
engaged in the provision of legal services for hire. By 2026, the
numbers of employed lawyers not providing “Legal Services for
hire” will increase slightly (7.7%) to 411,600.183 Notably, within this
context, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has stated that “a law school
graduate’s willingness to relocate and his or her practical experiences
are becoming more important.”184 This strongly suggests that another
area where law schools can look to add value is through the
development of a sustainable strategy for producing law graduates
prepared for geographic mobility, developing practical experiences,
and prepared to practice of law OUTSIDE the provision of legal
services for hire. Once again, the challenge will be in configuring
the individual law school’s resources to comply with the VRIO
framework.
3. Looking more specifically at the 410,000 U.S. lawyers who do
directly provide legal services for hire, there are multiple areas where
law schools can add value by tailoring educational offerings to
address emerging issues. For instance, how about developing a law
program specifically tailored to the needs of international business?
Look beyond the local practice of law to incorporate the global
context. Once again, the challenge will be in configuring the
individual law school’s resource to comply with the VRIO
framework.
4. Alternatively, extrapolating from the most recent 2016 ABA
employment data for recent graduates, indicates that, in reference to

(last visited Jan. 15, 2018) [hereinafter BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS] (compare
Code TE1000 to TE1100, [cells D6 and D7, respectively]).
181
Id. (comparing Code TE1100, 2016 [Cell D7] with 2026 [Cell G7]).
182
Id. (comparing Code TE1100 [Cell D6] to Code 54110 [Cell D129]).
183
Id. (comparing Code 54110, 2016 [Cell D129] with 2026 [Cell G129]). Note,
however, that the increase in total law enrollment (comparing Code TE1100 [Cell
D7] with 2026 [Cell G7]) will slightly outstrip the increases in employment in the
direct provision of legal services for hire.
184
See id.
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those employed as lawyers, there is an additional 21.93%185 of recent
law graduates employed in jobs which do not technically require bar
passage, but still consider a J.D. to be an advantage in employment.
Applying the 21.93% to the BLS data supports results in an
estimated 170,000 additional law graduates employed in non-law
positions where they are still directly benefitting from a law
license.186 To address this, law schools could add value by
developing a sustainable strategy for producing law graduates
successful outside the traditional practice of law. Once again, the
challenge will be in configuring the individual law school’s
resources to comply with the VRIO framework.
5. Similarly, recruit potential law students who are interested in using
their law degree in conjunction with other advanced degrees.
Extending the earlier example about producing exceptional oil and
gas attorneys, how about a J.D./ M.B.A. program that specifically
integrates the estimation of monetary value of individual oil and gas
wells? How about a J.D. combined with a MSc. in Petroleum
Engineering? Or how about a J.D. combined with an M.S. in
Computer Science? Whatever the decision, make sure to recruit, and
then deliver graduates that create value to their employers. This
strategy could be replicated across multiple potential industries with
multiple degrees.
6. Even ignoring all of the items in 1 through 5, the projections from
the BLS suggest that there are multiple niche categories for the
employment of lawyers within traditional practice areas. All that
individual law schools need to do is build a unique reputation for a
superior education—delivering superior lawyers. Look at the BLS
data.187 It breaks out attorney employment—including future
projections—into categories like Legal Services, Government,
Finance and Insurance, Management of Companies and Enterprises,
Waste Management and Remediation, Information, Manufacturing,
185
According to the 2016 ABA Recent Graduate Employment Data, the total
number of recent graduates who reported being in jobs requiring bar passage was
23,948. At the same time, the total number of recent graduates who reported being
in jobs where bar passage was not required but was still an advantage was 5,254.
5,254/23,948 = .2193. If this percentage is multiplied by 778,700 (the estimated
employment for all lawyers by the BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 180,
the estimate is 170,168.
186
Note, the BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS data, supra note 180, only includes
data on lawyers working as attorneys. See, tab, “What Lawyers Do.” This does not
include work in a capacity other than as a lawyer where the law degree is
unnecessary but still an advantage.
187
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 180.
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Educational Services, Healthcare and Social Assistance, Wholesale
Trade, Real Estate and Rental/Leasing, Mining, Quarrying, Oil &
Gas
Extraction,
Publishing
(except
Internet),
and
Computer/Electronic Mfg.188 Pick one, or drill down further and
identify an even clearer niche—then add unique value. Once the
optimal niche is identified, the individual law school simply needs to
configure their resources to comply with the VRIO framework.
7. Putting all of the other items aside, the creation of a sustainable
competitive really is not all that difficult. In fact, every time there is
any problem in the delivery or content of legal services or legal
standards, there is an opportunity for someone in legal education.
All the problems might not be sexy, but the opportunity is real if a
solution can be provided within the VRIO framework. Additionally,
always remember that the customer’s (potential student’s) perception
of value is what matters. Recall the example of Coke versus
Pepsi.189 Try walking down the soft drink isle of your local grocery
store and ask yourself—what do they know that law schools do not?
Better yet, pick up a bottle of Aquafina and ask yourself what is so
special about it?
In looking at the information above, there are numerous potential
opportunities for individual U.S. law schools to develop their own niche
VRIO offerings that provide unique value. In Stage 3, the challenge for the
Innovator and Catalyst Teams is to identify and determine which
opportunities most closely align with the individual law schools current and
potential capabilities.
4. Stage 4: Obtaining Team Agreement On Prioritization and
Recommendations
In Stage 4, members from all three teams and the Dean meet to
hopefully agree on a prioritized list of recommended opportunities and
corresponding resource estimates. During this meeting, members of the
Innovators and Catalyst Teams are free to advocate for particular
opportunities. Each is welcome to champion one or more options for
distinctive change at the individual law school. Each is also welcome to
explain related steps that should be taken to stop other schools from copying
the innovation. However, ultimately, the purpose of Stage 4 is to facilitate a
consensus across the active participants as to an agreed-upon list of
opportunities to recommend for adoption by the entire faculty.
188
189

Id.
See supra Part IV.B.
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For this reason, a secondary purpose of Stage 4 is an administrative failsafe to resolve any concerns between active participants before formal
recommendations are presented to the entire faculty. Stage 4 also provides
the Conveners Team and the Dean with the opportunity to limit the number
of recommended opportunities to some smaller number so as to ensure a
unanimous (or at least wide-spread) support for whatever is recommended.
The risk is that nominal disagreements on marginal opportunities will distract
the full faculty vote. Discarded opportunities can always be revisited during
future cycles. In this way, Stage 4 provides the Conveners Team with the
opportunity to engage the Dean and other teams in a consensus-building
meeting. Again, the goal is to assure wide-spread (if not unanimous) support
across all team members prior to formally making any recommendations to
the entire faculty.
5. Stage 5: Update and Integrate Strategy in Light of Prioritized
Opportunities
After having obtained a consensus across the teams and the Dean on a
prioritized recommended list of opportunities, in Stage 5, the Conveners “reconvene” the entire faculty or whatever group is in charge of strategic
planning for the law school. The purpose of Stage 5 is to assure that the
recommended opportunities align with the existing mission of the law school
but are also formally adopted in the form of a prioritized list of opportunities
that can be immediately pursued.
Given the strategic planning process previously explained in Part IV.C.,
it should be expected that Stage 5 will include the conscious consideration of
how the recommended opportunities align with the law school’s available
resources and the external environment. The strategic planning process
should include consideration of how the recommended opportunities create
unique value.
Accordingly, in evaluating different potential market
opportunities (specifically looking for VRIO characteristics), the law school
should start by conducting a SWOT analysis (if one has not already been
conducted by the Innovator or Catalyst Teams). At the same time, the law
school should evaluate its existing and potential resources “as providing a
key to what it can accomplish.”190 In particular, “[t]he school should pay
attention primarily to those strengths in which it possesses a differential
advantage [to other schools], that is, it can outperform competitors on that
dimension.”191
Once the evaluations required of Stage 5 have been completed, the
adjusted list should then be formally adopted—either in whole or in part (as
appropriate)—by either the entire faculty or whatever appropriate entity
190
191
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provides such formal acceptance in the given law school. Ideally, the
consideration and selection should be done as part of an open discussion that
includes all parties, including the external Catalyst Team members. Once
formally accepted, the next step (either within Stage 5 or 6—depending upon
the law school’s existing procedures) is to develop the individual strategies
explaining how each of the opportunities will be achieved. This can
incorporate recommendations that were previously made about how the
opportunities can best be achieved in practice. This should also include one
or more means of measuring the extent to which the individual strategies
have been successful. Moreover, for each objective, specific operational
plans (tactics) should be developed to achieve the corresponding objectives.
6. Stage 6: Implement and Monitor
Given that all steps should have been completed to identify, prioritize,
align, and authorize the pursuit of specific opportunities, Stage 6 involves the
implementation and monitoring of performance. In this regard, all parties
should remain cognizant that the recognition of a sustainable competitive
advantage requires both successful implementation and communication to
the market. Moreover, given the continuing need for faculty involvement, it
would be a huge mistake at this point to simply throw the opportunities over
the wall for someone else to handle. For this reason, it is important for the
Conveners Team and/or Dean to provide systematic updates to the faculty on
the progress of any selected opportunities. Similarly, it would be beneficial
to recruit participants from all earlier stages of the model to observe the
implementation and make recommendations for improvements.
Overall, it is assumed that the Dean will have primary responsibility for
managing the implementation process. However, at the very least, it is
recommended that Innovators also participate in the progress of monitoring
the performance of each individual plan. Given the central role of the
Innovators in identifying and prioritizing the opportunities, the Innovators
should be ideally suited to make sure that the implementation is done in a
way that is most likely to achieve the intended purposes. Innovators should
therefore recommend incremental adjustments that could enhance overall
performance. For this reason, it is recommended that Stage 6 continue (with
broad participation, monitoring, and reporting) until such time as the
individual success or failure for each opportunity has been determined.
7. Stage 7: System Reset and Repeat
Having completed all of the primary portions of the change process
model, the purpose of Stage 7 is to reset the process by integrating the
lessons learned for future use. To do this, the Dean and the Conveners Team
should debrief all team members and the general faculty regarding their
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experiences with the process. Special care should be taken to reinforce the
commitment to the process (overcome bounded willpower) and answer any
questions that may have arisen. In this same regard, the Conveners should
remain cognizant of potential problems presented by individual outcome
uncertainty. This can be easily addressed by simply inviting individual
faculty participation and involvement. It can be further addressed by noting
which faculty members might face particularly dramatic role changes by
virtue of the recommended opportunities, and allaying their concerns and
asking for their feedback. This feedback process can improve the model (or
the model’s performance) for its next iteration. Additionally, this process
can include scheduling the next iteration of the change process model,
adjusting the membership of the various teams, and potentially agreeing on
future deliverables.
VI. CONCLUSION
According to both behavioral economics and institutional theory, the
current problems in legal education are not simply caused by the stubborn
resistance to change. According to behavioral economics and psychology,
the problems for U.S. law schools started as soon as the decisional
considerations exceeded the cognitive limits and willpower of individual law
faculties. Eventually, further change was also hampered by the emergence of
a status quo bias.
Pursuant to institutional theory within sociology, the problems with
organizational decision-making probably began as soon as U.S. law schools
began to coalesce into an institutional field. Although the resulting
institutional pressures assured stability across the field, the pressures also
created barriers to meaningful organizational adaptation. These impediments
meant that, while U.S. law schools remained stable, the broader society and
the practice of law continued to change. Alignment was lost.
Now, U.S. law schools face the potential consequences of an exogenous
shock to legal education. Both the number and quality of law school
applicants have collapsed. With the devastating economic impact on law
school budgets, law schools now have to make a choice. Do they want to
seek meaningful adaptation? Given differences in resources and market
positions across U.S. law schools, the individual decisions may vary.
However, one way or another, the carrying capacity of the field will reach a
new equilibrium. The supply and demand curve will reach a new equilibrium
too. The question is how many schools will successfully and uniquely adapt
versus how many will decide to merge or simply disappear.
For law schools seeking to adapt, institutional entrepreneurship offers
several promising mechanisms to navigate the limitations identified by both
behavioral economics and institutional theory.
Through institutional
entrepreneurship there is a vehicle for temporarily overriding decisional
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constraints by convening the general faculty and leveraging especially
promising opportunities. Moreover, facilitating change within the VRIO
framework enables the selection and deployment of specific opportunities
that can provide sustainable competitive advantages.
The proposed seven-stage process change model provides a preliminary
effort to put it all together. However, ultimately, the success of these efforts
will be evidenced by the extent to which individual law schools successfully
achieve an improved, unique, and sustainable alignment of their resources
with the external needs of their law students, the legal profession, and society
at large. Looking at the external data, it is clear that meaningful
opportunities remain. Success is potentially available to virtually all U.S. law
schools—but only if they choose to meaningfully implement and adapt. To
the extent that multiple law schools become meaningfully engaged in this
process, the future is truly promising.
Let’s get started.

